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some structured transactions are so complex that disclosure to inves-
tors of the company originating the transaction is necessarily imper-
fect-either oversimplifying the transaction, or providing detail and 
sophistication beyond the level of even most institutional investors 
and securities analysts. In this article, Professor Schwarcz focuses on 
solutions to this dilemma, arguing that complexity forces a rethinking 
of the long-held disclosure paradigm of securities law. 
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I. INTRODUCfION 
Though itself sui generis, 2 the Enron debacle highlights the increas-
ingly widespread problem of complexity,3 illuminating concerns that arise 
in-and indeed are intrinsic to-virtually all securitization and deriva-
tives deals and other forms of structured-financing transactions (struc-
tured transactions).4 In Enron's case, the company engaged in a range of 
manipulative accounting transactions that contributed to its downfall.s 
Its primary motivation was to minimize financial-statement losses and 
volatility,6 accelerate profits,? and avoid adding debt to its balance sheet, 
which could have hurt Enron's credit rating and thereby damage its 
credibility in the energy trading business.8 A common factor in these ma-
nipulations was the use of nonconsolidated special purpose entities 
(SPEs) to hedge certain Enron investments.9 
In a typical transaction, Enron would transfer its own stock, or 
rights therein, to an SPE in exchange for a note or cash,I° and also would 
directly or indirectly guarantee the SPE's valueY The SPE, in turn, 
would hedge the value of a particular investment on Enron's balance 
sheet, using the transferred Enron stock as the principal source of pay-
ment. 12 Because of its historically rising stock price, Enron apparently 
2. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. 
LAW. 1403, 1403-04 (2002) (arguing for Enron's uniqueness). 
3. I use the term "complexity" in its ordinary meaning: the state of being complicated. FUNK & 
WAGNALL'S STANDARD DICTIONARY 144 (2d ed. 1993). 
4. Although I analyze complexity in the context of structured transactions, the problems of 
complexity discussed in this article are not unique to those transactions; thus, my analysis should apply 
in other transactional contexts where complexity may become problematic. 
5. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities 
in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309 (2002) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Use and Abuse of Spe-
cial Purpose Entities]. 
6. William C. Powers, Jr. et aI., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee 
of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. 4, 68, 78, 97 (2002) [hereinafter Powers Report], available at 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf. 
7. E-mail from Jennifer Francis, Associate Professor of Accounting, The Fuqua School of 
Business, to Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Apr. 7, 2002, 
12:16 EST) (on file with author). 
8. Powers Report, supra note 6, at 36. 
9. For an argument that Enron's downfall may have resulted partly from certain misrepresenta-
tions unrelated to SPE transactions, see Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden 
Death of "May," 48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1245-46 (2003) [hereinafter Partnoy, A Revisionist View of 
Enron]. 
10. See, e.g., Powers Report, supra note 6, at 13. 
11. [d. at 36-37. 
12. See, e.g., id. at 13. Although not used in the original "Chewco" SPE transaction, hedging was 
used in virtually all subsequent SPE transactions. Id. These hedged transactions can be schematically 
represented as follows: 
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judged the risk that it would have to pay on its guaranties as remote-
and the risk that Enron would have to make such payments at the same 
time that the SPE-hedged investments fell in value was even more re-
mote. But Enron's stock price and the value of its SPE-hedged invest-
ments did simultaneously fall, triggering the Enron guaranties while de-
priving the SPEs of sufficient assets to perform the hedges.13 This 
combination of events led to a swift downward spiral in Enron's financial 
condition.14 
I argued in a prior article that there are meaningful economic dif-
ferencesl5 between Enron's manipulations and the trillions of dollars of 
non-Enron structured transactions that use SPEs,t6 of which securitiza-
tion transactions17 constitute the bulk. IS For example, unlike in Enron, 
Enron I Enren stock 
I 
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13. See Schwarcz, Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities, supra note 5, at 1310, 1315-16. 
14. The guarantee payments apparently further reduced Enron stock value, triggering additional 
guarantees, while the inability of the SPEs to perform their hedge resulted in a restatement of Enron's 
earnings. [d. at 1310. Plus, in some cases the ab initio lack of sufficient SPE third-party equity caused 
the SPEs to breach the three percent independent equity requirement for non-consolidation, thereby 
bringing the SPEs' debt onto Enron's balance sheet. See id. at 1310-11. 
15. Being economic, these differences are not discernable from the legal structure of a given 
transaction. If they were, this article would not be needed because government could simply ban all 
Enron-type transactions. 
16. Schwarcz, Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities, supra note 5, at 1314. 
17. In a typical securitization transaction, a company transfers rights to payment from income-
producing financial assets-such as accounts receivable, loans, or lease rentals-to an SPE, which in 
turn transfers such rights to a second SPE, which in turn issues securities to capital market investors. 
The second SPE uses the proceeds of the issuance to pay the first SPE for the financial assets, and the 
first SPE then uses those proceeds to pay the company. The investors, who are repaid from collections 
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structured transactions typically transfer substantive risk away from the 
company originating, or sponsoring, the transaction (the originator)19 to 
the SPE, thereby justifying off-balance sheet financing.20 Additionally, 
structured transactions are often used "to obtain lower-cost-financing 
through disintermediation, or removal of intermediaries such as bank 
lenders between the [originator] and the ultimate source of funds, the 
capital markets.'>21 Thus, these transactions are normally viewed as so-
cially desirable.22 
Notwithstanding that desirability, these transactions are always ex-
tremely complex and, in the case of securitizations, often rely on multiple 
SPES.23 Furthermore, in order to integrate disparate disciplines such as 
bankruptcy, tax, securities law, commercial law, accounting, and finance, 
structured transactions often appear to be highly convoluted.24 Disclo-
of the financial assets, buy the securities based on their assessments of the value of the financial assets. 
See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1999) 
[hereinafter Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing). For a more complete analysis 
of securitization, see STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
ASSET SECURmZATION (Adam D. Ford ed., 3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter STRUCTURED FINANCE); Steven 
L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FiN. 133 (1994) [hereinafter 
Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization). 
18. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, The Brick Stood up Before. But Now?, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 10, 
2002, § 3, at 1 (referring to SPEs used in securitization transactions as "the most common special-
purpose entities"); see also STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 17, § 1:1, at 1-2 (discussing the relation-
ship between structured finance and securitization). 
19. I use the term "originator" to help distinguish companies that originate transactions from 
SPEs created to help effectuate transactions. 
20. Schwarcz, Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities, supra note 5, at 1315; see also infra 
notes 126-31 and accompanying text (discussing transfer of investment risk). 
21. Schwarcz, Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities, supra note 5, at 1315. 
22. See, e.g., Gaire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. u. L.Q. 
1061, 1085-111 (1996) [hereinafter Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons); see also 
infra notes 124-31 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of structured transactions). But cf 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 24-25 (1996) (arguing that structured 
transactions can lead to judgment proofing). I counter Professor LoPucki's arguments in Schwarcz, 
The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, supra note 17. 
23. See Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, supra note 22, at 1063; see also 
Schwarcz, Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities, supra note 5. 
24. This can be illustrated by the following simplified schematic of a healthcare securitization 
conduit established by a leading investment firm, with the author's counsel, in order to provide low-
cost financing to hospitals. Its purposes were salutary on all levels, but its structure might appear un-
necessarily complex: 
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sure of a complex and convoluted structure to investors of the origina-
tor-the audience on which this article primarily focuses-may well be 
either too detailed for many of those investors, even institutional inves-
tors, to understand and assimilate,25 or too superficial to allow investors 
to fully assess the transaction and its ramifications.26 The problem is 
compounded where, as is common, an originator engages in numerous 
such transactions.27 
In Enron, for example,28 there is no dispute that the existence of the 
SPE-transactions was generally disclosed to Enron's investors.29 The dis-
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25. See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text. 
26. A possible response is to require both levels of disclosure: a simple but potentially insuffi-
cient level intended for all of the originator's investors, and the fully extensive level given to the SPE's 
investors. The latter information, for example, could be required to be placed on file with the SEC 
and available for interested parties. This response, however, would significantly raise the cost of dis-
closure, while not necessarily helping investors who cannot understand the higher level of disclosure. 
Also, it would not work where, as is common, the detailed structure of the transactions are confiden-
tial-such as for private placements where the deal structure is viewed as a trade secret not intended 
for public dissemination. See, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Patriarch Partners, LLC, No. 3:01-CV-547-
MU, (W.D.N.C. filed Sept. 24, 2001) (lawsuit claiming improper use of trade secret consisting of de-
tails of securitization transaction); see also E-mail from Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, University of 
San Diego School of Law, to Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law 
(Sept. 17,2002,21:38 EST) (on file with the author) (observing that his former colleagues at the Mor-
gan Stanley investment-banking firm "would have balked at the idea" of permitting disclosure of the 
details of deals). 
27. See Schwarcz, Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities, supra note 5. 
28. Although the SPE transactions in Enron are not generally illustrative of structured transac-
tions, all of these transactions share the characteristic of complexity. 
29_ See Powers Report, supra note 6, at 200-01 ("[W]hile it has been widely reported that the 
related-party transactions connected to Fastow involved 'secret' partnerships and other SPEs, we be-
lieve that is not generally the case .... [T]he fact remains that the UM partnerships, the Raptor enti-
ties, and transactions between Enron and those entities all were disclosed to some extent in Enron's 
public filings. "). 
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closure itself, however, was ultimately said to be inadequate.30 Although 
this inadequacy might have been intentionally fraudulent, the better ex-
planation is that Enron's structured transactions were so complex that 
disclosure either would have had to oversimplify the transactions or else 
provide detail and sophistication beyond the level of both ordinary and 
otherwise savvy institutional investors in Enron securitiesY The same 
explanation accounts for the failure of many institutional investors and 
securities analysts to understand non-Enron structured transactions.32 
This explanation, however, goes to the very heart of securities regulation, 
which relies exclusively on disclosure as its regulatory methodology,33 
and on sophisticated investors and analysts to bring market prices into 
line with disclosure.34 
This article questions whether securities regulation should continue 
to rely exclusively on disclosure. Part II.A of the article argues that, in a 
world of complexity, disclosure can be insufficient to remedy the infor-
mation asymmetry35 between the originator and its investors.36 Part n.B 
of the article examines possible responses to this information insuffi-
ciency: to tolerate it; to ban or proscribe transactions for which the in-
formation asymmetry exceeds certain bounds; or to require supplemental 
30. See id. at 197 (contending that, notwithstanding disclosures of the existence of the SPEs to 
Enron's investors, such disclosures "failed to achieve a fundamental objective: they did not communi-
cate the essence of the transactions in a sufficiently clear fashion to enable a reader of [Enron's] finan-
cial statements to understand what was going on"); see also id. at 17, 192. 
31. Schwarcz, Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities, supra note 5, at 1316-17; cf Graydon 
"Dee" Hubbard, Early Signs of Failure Evident in Enron Col/apse, Hous. Bus. J., Apr. 5, 2002 (argu-
ing that although "analysts, investment bankers, investors and lenders had enough information [from 
Enron's audited financial statements] to see" Enron's demise, they failed to do so), available at 
http://www.houston.bizjournals.com/houstonistoriesI2002l04/08/editorial3.html. 
32. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (arguing that complexity goes far beyond En-
ron, that relatively few people can understand structured transactions, and that some transactions may 
not even be understandable by any single person). 
33. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing how scholars initially envisioned 
sophisticated market intermediaries would filter information to investors), notes 102-03 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the efficient market hypothesis, under which scholars and regulators presently 
see market prices reflecting disclosure). 
35. A related question is whether some structured transactions are, or can be, so complex that, 
rather than an information asymmetry, there is an inherent lack of information on both sides-the 
originator's management and the investors. It appears that few of Enron's board members understood 
its SPE transactions. Powers Report, supra note 6, at 23 (observing that although Enron's board au-
thorized the Rhythms transaction and three of the Raptor transactions, "it appears that many of its 
members did not understand those transactions-the economic rationale, the consequences, and the 
risks"). There is a similar lack of understanding in derivatives transactions. See, e.g., Margery Wax-
man, The Lesson of Orange County: It Takes a Crisis to Focus Public Policy on the Need for Adequate 
Disclosure of Risk, 63 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 944 (Dec. 19, 1994) ("There is no doubt that the 
complexity of [derivatives] transactions has made it more difficult for even the most sophisticated sen-
ior management to understand or evaluate the benefits or the risks associated with using these deriva-
tives. "). Although beyond the scope of this article, the consequences of this lack of information and 
the normative response thereto may be matters worthy of further research. 
36. Those investors are, of course, the originator's shareholders and bondholders-i.e., its equity 
and debt investors. They should be distinguished from the very narrow and highly specialized class of 
sophisticated investors in securities issued by the SPEs that are parties to the originator's structured 
transactions. 
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protections to minimize that asymmetry or mitigate its consequencesY 
Part II.B.l shows that the long-standing belief that markets will compen-
sate for disclosure's insufficiency-the efficient market hypothesis-is 
not justified in a world of complexity, and that relying on investors to 
discount the share price of originators engaging in complex transactions 
would be inefficient.38 Thus, toleration of disclosure's insufficiencies is 
undesirable. Part II.B.2 contends that the second response, proscribing 
complex transactions, would be socially harmfu1.39 Part II.B.3 argues for 
the third response, maintaining that disclosure should be supplemented 
by cost-effective protections, particularly in the area of corporate gov-
ernance.40 Absent adequate disclosure, an originator's investors may 
have to rely on the business judgment of the originator's management in 
entering into a complex transaction for the originator's benefit. This re-
liance can be protected by requiring management-in transactions in 
which complexity renders any form of disclosure insufficient-to be free 
of material conflicts of interest stemming from those transactions. This 
would minimize the opportunity for fraud and enhance investor confi-
dence by prohibiting the most troublesome conflicts of interest that 
tempt managers to engage in fraudulently complex transactions.41 
II. ANALYSIS 
Analysis of the tension between investor understanding and com-
plexity remains scant. During the debate over the original enactment of 
the federal securities laws, Congress did not focus on the ability of inves-
tors to understand disclosure of complex transactions.42 Although schol-
37. See discussion infra Part 1I.B.1-.3. 
38. See infra Part II.B.1. 
39. See infra Part II.B.2. 
40. See infra Part II.B.3. 
41. The distinction between fraudulent and nonfraudulent complexity might be likened to the 
distinction between three-card Monte and quantum mechanics. In the former case, the complexity is 
intended for obfuscation, whereas in the latter it is inherent in the nature of things. 
42. Robert L. Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REv. 607, 615 (1964) 
("Whether the disclosure approach alone would in fact protect small investors from fraudulent 
schemes or the making of poor investments was generally not discussed."). The focus of the congres-
sional debate was on whether to choose disclosure or substantive regulation of the right of companies 
to issue securities as the policy that would inform the securities laws. President Roosevelt, influenced 
by the views of Louis D. Brandeis, advocated the disclosure approach. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 18, 99-102 (8th prtg. 1932) (arguing that 
disclosure can reform the system through which bankers "control the people through the people's own 
money" because, by disclosing their profits to investors, bankers would be effectively forced to charge 
more reasonable fees). Subsequently, however, Congress did attempt to deal with complexity in the 
investment trusts arena by enacting the Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 
789 (1940) [hereinafter the '40 Act], which imposes both disclosure requirements and substantive regu-
lations. See 86 CONGo REC. 2844 (1940) (statement of Sen. Wagner) ("The underlying purpose of the 
legislation is not merely to ensure to investors a full and fair disclosure ... but to eliminate and pre-
vent those deficiencies and abuses in these organizations which have contributed to the tremendous 
losses sustained by their security holders."); 86 CONGo REc. app. at 1478 (1940) (editorial from the 
New York Times on Mar. 16, 1940) ("It does not require the simplification of existing systems of in-
vestment companies, but does try to eliminate the evils of complex capital structures in the future."). 
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ars assumed that ordinary investors would not have that ability,43 they an-
ticipated that sophisticated market intermediaries-such as brokers, 
bankers, investment advisers, publishers of investment advisory litera-
ture, and even lawyers-would help filter the information down to inves-
tors.44 
In recent years, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) touched on this issue by promoting the use of plain English in an 
attempt to manage the growing complexity of disclosure documents.45 
But plain English primarily addresses the problem of overly legalistic 
writing; it is not an adequate solution for the problem of inherently com-
plex transactions.46 
Complexity has also been addressed to some extent in a derivatives 
context.47 Because even sophisticated institutional investors can lack the 
ability to understand derivatives transactions,48 investments in derivative 
instruments have sometimes given rise to spectacular losses.49 In re-
sponse, in 1997, the SEC attempted to deal with derivatives risk through 
disclosure.5o Although derivatives themselves are not necessarily re-
In particular, the '40 Act targeted the negative behavior of interested parties as a pervasive threat to 
investors, and sought to minimize conflicts. See 86 CONGo REC. at 2844-45 (statement of Sen. Wagner) 
("Because of [the] absence of safeguards, promoters and managers of investment companies have 
been able to determine every aspect of their affairs in an atmosphere of self-dealing and conflicting 
interests devoid of arms-length bargaining .... In general, the theory of the ['40 Act] is to eliminate 
wherever possible such abuses by direct prohibition of their continuance. "). I later argue that com-
plexity sometimes requires not only the usual disclosure requirements, but also substantive regulation 
to minimize conflicts. See infra notes 181-219 and accompanying text. 
43. DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UN-
DER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS (THE WHEAT REPORT) 52 (1969) [hereinafter THE WHEAT REPORT]; ac-
cord William O. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521, 524 (1934). 
44. THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 43, at 52. 
45. J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 2.02[6], at 2-41 
(3d ed. Supp. 2002 & 2002-2). 
46. Id. 
47. The term "derivative" refers generically to any instrument created by a contract whose value 
is based on another asset or financial instrument. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, More than Just 
"New Financial Bingo": A Risk-Based Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1,6-14 
(1997). 
48. See Norman S. Poser, Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable Recommendations to Institu-
tional Investors, 2001 BYU L. REv. 1493, 1521; accord Christine Cuccia, Information Asymmetry and 
OTC Transactions: Understanding the Need to Regulate Derivatives, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 197, 206 
(1997) (stating that some of the nation's most sophisticated asset managers do not understand deriva-
tives); Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron, supra note 9, at 1263 n.81 (noting "skepticism that even 
sophisticated securities analysts could draw anything of value out of financial disclosures about deriva-
tives") (internal citation omitted). 
49. See, e.g., 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURffiES REGULATION § 1.7[5], at 119 (4th 
ed.2002) (referring to "Orange County California's tremendous losses [and resulting bankruptcy] as a 
result of' poorly understood investments in exotic derivatives); Christian O. Nagler, Note, Derivatives 
Disclosure Requirements: Here We Go Again, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'y 441 (1997) (providing 
lengthy treatment of derivatives investment failure by Bankers Trust, affecting Procter & Gamble and 
Gibson Greetings); cf Saul Hansell, A U.S. Look for Lessons in Barings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,1995, at 
D1 (discussing downfall of Barings PLC due to a one billion dollar loss caused by derivatives trading). 
50. See Martin H. Dozier, Note, Baring's Ghost: Item 305 in SEC Regulation S-K and "Market 
Risk" Disclosure of Financial Derivatives, 34 GA. L. REV. 1417, 1420-21 (2000). 
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garded (and thus not regulated) as securities,5! the SEC issued Item 305 
of SEC Regulation S_K,52 requiring companies making SEC filings to dis-
close their risk exposure to derivatives instruments. 53 This disclosure is 
"intended to clarify the registrant's exposures to market risk associated 
with activities in derivative [and other financial] instruments."54 The dis-
closure should be presented outside of the financial statements, and may 
even be made as part of the management discussion and analysis of fi-
nancial condition and results of operations (MD&A) portion of SEC re-
porting.55 The goal is to require companies to provide both quantitative56 
and, to the extent material, qualitative information about derivatives 
risk.57 
To date, there do not appear to be empirical data indicating the suc-
cess or failure of derivatives disclosure. The costs imposed on companies 
to prepare these disclosures, however, have averaged almost $50,000,58 
substantially greater than the $8,000 originally estimated by the SEC.59 
51. 1 HAZEN, supra note 49, § 1.7[5], at 119 (discussing that, for the most part, "exotic deriva-
tives are not subject to regulation as securities because they involve contracts between the creator and 
the investor where the gains of one are the losses of the other; thus, swaps and the like do not involve 
a common enterprise"). 
52. 17 C.F.R. § 229.305 (2003). Regulation S-K "contains the informational disclosure require-
ments for both the 1933 [Securities] Act and the 1934 [Securities Exchange] Act," including "a de-
tailed description of the ways in which the disclosed information must be presented." 2 HAzEN, supra 
note 49, § 9.4[2], at 23-24. 
53. 17 C.F.R. § 229.305; see also 1 HAZEN, supra note 49, § 1.7[5], at 120-21 (discussing Item 305 
and derivatives disclosure); Quinton F. Seamons, Requirements and Pitfalls of MD&A Disclosure, 25 
SEC. REG. L. J. 239, 269-71 (1997); Dozier, supra note 50, at 1450-51. Although brokers also may be 
liable for their failure to adequately disclose the risks of derivatives instruments they sell, compare In 
re Gibson Greetings, Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 730, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 'lI 74,245 (Oct. 11, 1995), the focus of my article is on disclosure to investors by the company 
purchasing such instruments. I do not focus, for example, on the question of whether derivatives mar-
kets should be regulated. Cf The Fall of Enron: How Could It Have Happened?: Hearings Before the 
Senate Comm on Governmental Affairs, l07th Congo (2002) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of 
Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law) (arguing for such regula-
tion), available at http://www.senate.gov/-gov_affairslOI2402partnoy.htm. Nor do I focus on whether 
the suitability doctrine should be applicable to institutional investors in derivatives. Cf Willa E. Gib-
son, Investors, Look Before You Leap: The Suitability Doctrine Is Not Suitable for OTC Derivatives 
Dealers, 29 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 527,571 (1998) (discussing whether imposing suitability obligations on 
derivatives dealers makes sense); Poser, supra note 48, at 1510-12 (arguing that many institutional in-
vestors lack the ability to understand the nature and risks of complex derivative-investments that secu-
rities firms sell to their customers). 
54. 17 C.F.R. § 229.305 (Paragraph 1 of General Instructions to Paragraphs 305(a) and 305(b) of 
Item 305). 
55. Id. (Paragraph 6 of General Instructions to Paragraphs 305(a) and 305(b) of Item 305). The 
purpose is to provide a management narrative that informs investors how the company's exposure to 
derivative risk is managed. See id. § 229.305(b)(I). 
56. Id. § 229.305(a). 
57. Id. § 229.305(b). 
58. Joe Godwin, Current Accounting Projects, Remarks at 1998 Twenty-Sixth Annual National 
Conference on Current SEC Developments (Dec. 9, 1998) (referring to data collected by the Ameri-
can Bankers Association in a 1998 study), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechlspeecharchive/ 
1998/spch240.htm. 
59. See Steve Burkhoder, Witnesses at Senate Hearing Split on SEC, FASB Derivatives Regula-
tions, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 322, 323 (1997). Since that time, the FASB has issued Statement 
133 (SFAS 133, issued June 1998), governing accounting for investment in derivatives. Although 
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More importantly, and consistent with a pre implementation survey of 
Item 305 conducted by the Treasury Management Association60 (in 
which more than half of the respondents predicted that Item 305 would 
not improve investor understanding of derivative exposure) there re-
mains real concern whether derivatives disclosure is adequate.61 Profes-
sor Partnoy, for example, observes that Enron's use of derivatives was 
not fully transparent to Enron's investors.62 Partnoy notes that an argu-
ment can be made "that Enron satisfied its disclosure obligation" even 
though "the result of Enron's method of disclosure was that investors did 
not get a clear picture of the firm's finances.,,63 The SEC's former Dep-
uty Chief of Economics argues that Item 305 requires disclosure of only 
market-based risks,64 whereas derivatives losses "'generally involve issues 
unrelated to disclosure and accounting, such as poor internal controls, 
bad judgment, incompetence, and, perhaps, fraud."'65 Other commenta-
tors argue that Item 305-mandated disclosure of "worst case" scenarios 
can overemphasize unlikely risks, while ignoring risks that are more real-
istic.66 And, although the SEC, in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, recently amended the MD&A disclosure requirements to require 
an explanation of a firm's off-balance sheet arrangements and a tabular 
presentation of certain of its contractual obligations, that change would 
not even have required disclosure of the Enron transactions.67 
Statement 133 requires a more simplified and uniform set of disclosures than Item 305, the SEC has 
not yet revised its policy in response. 
60. See Suzanne McGee, Derivative Dealers Blast Rule Proposals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1996, at 
C16. 
61. See, e.g., Peter Coy et aI., Where the Risk Went, Bus. WK., Oct. 28,2002, at 98 (observing that 
the "explosive growth of securitization and derivatives during the 1990s" has raised concerns about the 
efficacy of disclosure); see also Steve Liesman, Deciphering the Black Box: Many Accounting Practices, 
Not Just Enron's, Are Hard to Penetrate, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at C1 (quoting Philip Livingston, 
President of Financial Executives International, as calling the new rules for derivatives "a monstrosity 
of accounting standards that nobody understands," including accountants and chief financial officers). 
62. Hearings, supra note 53, at 11-12 (testimony of Frank Partnoy). 
63. [d. at 12; see also Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron, supra note 9, at 1258-59 (explaining 
why "Enron's disclosure arguably satisfied SEC rules"). 
64. Market-based risks generally result from shifts in the market of the underlying commodity, 
reference rate, index, asset, etc. See Krawiec, supra note 47, at 17-30 (offering a detailed analysis of 
market-risk assessment). Item 305 divides market risks into "interest rate risk, foreign currency ex-
change rate risk, commodity price risk, and other relevant market risks, such as equity price risk." 17 
C.F.R. § 229.305(a)(1) (2003). 
65. Burkholder, supra note 59, at 323 (quoting Kenneth Lehn, former SEC Deputy Chief of 
Economics); accord Krawiec, supra note 47, at 41-42 (arguing that non-market risks were at least as 
much to blame for the collapse of Barings, PLC). 
66. See, e.g., Dozier, supra note 50, at 1477 (arguing that Item 305's requirement that companies 
disclose a set of the "worst case" scenarios detailing the "aggregate potential for loss" from derivatives 
due to hypothetical changes, see 17 C.F.R. § 229.305 (1998) (Instructions to Paragraph 305(a», is likely 
to "[divert] the investor's attention from more realistic scenarios and [focus] it solely on an unlikely 
scenario"). 
67. Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron, supra note 9, at 1278 ("Disclosure of 'reasonably 
likely' contingencies would not likely have prevented the problems associated with Enron. Indeed, 
Enron was in compliance with the newly-enacted SEC regulations."). 
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In short, in the area of complexity of structured transactions in 
which the SEC and commentators have devoted the most attention and 
scrutiny to date, disclosure does not appear to solve the asymmetric in-
formation problem. Moreover, other forms of structured transactions, 
such as securitizations, may raise even greater problems for disclosure 
than derivatives. The latter are normally arm's length transactions be-
tween unrelated parties-the company and, for example, a derivatives 
dealer.68 In contrast, securitization transactions often involve SPEs that 
are managed by one or more officers of the originator, creating the pos-
sibility-as occurred in Enron-of real conflicts of interest.69 These con-
flicts can undermine the reliability of disclosure.7o The existence of these 
conflicts makes derivatives complexity an imperfect model for analyzing 
complexity in structured transactions. 
Furthermore, this article seeks a normative answer to the problem 
of complexity in structured transactions. The fact that the SEC, through 
Item 305, has chosen disclosure as the positive-law means of remedying 
the information asymmetry in the derivatives context-even if deriva-
tives were an appropriate model-is not necessarily compelling as a 
normative argument either in that context or in the context of structured 
transactions generally.?! 
This analysis therefore begins by looking to the fundamentals: the 
rationalization for the disclosure paradigm and whether that rationale is 
sufficient in cases of complexity. 
A. Disclosure Is Insufficient in a World of Complexity 
In the United States, "federal securities law's exclusive focus is on 
full disclosure.'>72 The underlying rationale is that 
investors are adequately protected if all relevant aspects of the se-
curities being marketed are fully and fairly disclosed. The reason-
68. See JOHN F. MARSHALL & KENNETH R. KAPNER, THE SWAPS MARKET 14-19 (2d ed. 1993) 
(discussing facilitators of derivatives transactions, and observing that most derivatives activity involves 
dealers); see also DERIVATNES POLICY GROUP, FRAMEWORK FOR VOLUNTARY OVERSIGHT 37 (Mar. 
1995) (noting that over-the-counter "derivatives transactions are predominately arm's length transac-
tions"); Gibson, supra note 53, at 574-77 (discussing the arm's-length nature of most over-the-counter 
derivatives contracts). 
69. Schwarcz, Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities, supra note 5, at 1317-18. A contribut-
ing factor to the failure of derivatives disclosure in Enron may have been Enron's use of special pur-
pose entities to engage in the derivatives hedging. 
70. Only if these conflicts are eliminated, as I later argue should be done, would the complexity 
analysis of structured transactions be on a common ground, focusing on the risk that management will 
guess wrong and make bad investments. 
71. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1807, 1814-15 (1998) (arguing that "the appropriate response to an 'ought' claim is an 'ought not' 
claim, not an 'is' claim"). I recognize, however, that Item 305 does reflect, to some extent, how regula-
tors and others have viewed the complexity issue to date. 
n. 1 HAZEN, supra note 49, § 8.1[1][B)' at 740; see also id. § 1.2[3], at 27 (explaining that "[t]he 
focus on disclosure was based on the conclusion that sunlight is the best disinfectant") (paraphrasing 
BRANDEIS, supra note 42, at 92). 
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ing is that full disclosure provides investors with sufficient opportu-
nity to evaluate the merits of an investment and fend for them-
selves. It is a basic tenet of federal securities regulation that inves-
tors' ability to make their own evaluations of available investments 
obviates any need that some observers may perceive for the more 
costly and time-consuming governmental merit analysis of the secu-
rities being offered.73 
At least one prominent commentator, Professor Ronald Gilson, has as-
serted that disclosure is the best way to prevent future Enron-type deba-
cles.74 But full disclosure of structured transactions does not, as a practi-
cal matter, provide investors in the originator's securities with sufficient 
opportunity to evaluate the merits of an investment. Moreover, most in-
vestors do not have the ability to evaluate structured transactions. 
To understand why disclosure fails in this context, consider the En-
ron-SPE transactions. The Powers Report,15 which attempts to describe 
only "the substance of the most significant [of those] transactions,"76 is 
over 200 pages long.77 And the Powers Report was prepared with the 
benefit of hindsight and with the assistance of some of the finest legal 
73. 1 id. § l.2[3][A], at 28. 
74. See Henriques, supra note 18, § 3, at 1 (quoting Professor Gilson as emphasizing disclosure: 
"Companies that want to use complicated structured-financing techniques should be prepared to ex-
plain them completely ... [a ]nd in plain English .... "). 
75. See Powers Report, supra note 6. 
76. [d. at l. 
77. To the extent the complexity of Enron's SPE transactions was based more on three-card 
Monte than quantum mechanics, see supra note 41 and accompanying text (using this analogy to ex-
plain the distinction between fraudulent and nonfraudulent complexity), the length of the Powers Re-
port imperfectly reflected an attempt to describe nonfraudulent SPE transactions. Based on my ex-
perience, however, I do not think its length is far off the mark for such a description. For example, a 
review of twenty structured-transaction disclosure documents, reflecting a cross-section of originators 
and SPEs, but otherwise randomly chosen, indicates that the average length of the transaction descrip-
tion alone in these documents is forty single-spaced print pages or, conforming to the equivalent type-
face of the Powers Report, eighty-four pages. Memorandum from Emily A. Locher, 1.D. 2003 Duke 
University School of Law & M.B.A. 2003 Fuqua School of Business, to Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor 
of Law, Duke University School of Law (Mar. 3, 2(03) (on file with author) (noting also that the me-
dian transaction description length was thirty-eight pages (seventy-nine pages when conformed to 
equivalent Powers Report typeface), and the standard deviation of the transaction description length 
was seventeen pages (thirty-six pages when conformed to equivalent Powers Report typeface». 
Though written in plain English, these descriptions are also extremely difficult to understand, even for 
sophisticated readers, because of the inherent complexity of the deals they describe. E-mail from 
Emily A. Locher, 1.D. 2003 Duke University School of Law & M.B.A. Fuqua School of Business, to 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Mar. 4, 2003, 11:59 EST) (on 
file with author). Because a typical originator engages in multiple structured transactions (e.g., an 
EDGAR search for publicly filed SPE disclosure documents found, on February 27, 2003, that eight of 
the eighteen originators surveyed each had over fifty public deals and that five of those eight each had 
over 100 public deals) and there may well be, in the author's experience, additional private deals 
(though the originator's investors may not even be permitted to review disclosure documents prepared 
for private structured-transactions, particularly where, as is common, the detailed structure of the 
transactions are confidential; see supra note 26 and accompanying text), the job of an investor in the 
originator to understand all such transactions can approach the task of understanding an Enron-type 
situation. Although originators may try to boil down the disclosure of all these deals into a single dis-
closure document delivered, as applicable, to its investors, I have argued that such a level of disclosure 
may be too superficial to be truly meaningful. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
No.1] RETHINKING THE DISCLOSURE PARADIGM 13 
talent in the nation.78 But complexity goes far beyond Enron, involving, 
for example, such mainstream companies as IBM, Coca-Cola, General 
Electric, and American International Group.79 A recent article even 
claims that some structures are getting so complex that they are incom-
prehensible.so To some extent, that claim is hyperbolic. If humans create 
the structures, then humans can decipher them. In other words, it is not 
that people cannot understand the structures, it is just that relatively few 
can do SO,81 and some structures may not even be able to be understood 
by any single person.82 
This nonetheless begs the question whether institutional investors-
or securities analysts, on whom investors often rely-will hire teams of 
structured-transaction experts as needed to decipher complex deals. The 
evidence suggests they do not,83 and theory explains why. Although ex-
78. See Press Release, Enron Corp., Enron Special Comm. Completes Investigation and Issues 
Report (Feb. 2, 2(02), at http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/releases/2002/ene/020202ReleaseLtr. 
html (stating that the investi!\ation was "conducted over approximately three months with the assis· 
tance of experienced legal counsel from Wilmer, Cutler, & Pickering"). 
79. Liesman, supra note 61, at Cl (explaining that "corporations, and what they do, have become 
more complex"); see also Christopher Oster & Ken Brown, AIG: A Complex Industry, a Very Com-
plex Company, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at Cl (observing, in the context of American International 
Group, that the problem is "not obfuscation, it's sheer complexity"); Melanie Warner, Can GE Light 
up the Market Again?, FORTUNE, Nov. 11,2002, at 108 (discussing General Electric's disclosure prob-
lems, which are largely due to structured transactions). 
80. David Barboza, Complex El Paso Partnerships Puzzle Analysts, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at 
Cl (discussing that "one industry giant, the El Paso Corporation, is growing ever more reliant on deals 
[using off-balance sheet partnerships] so complex that securities experts call them incomprehensible"); 
see also David Cay Johnston, Tax Moves by Enron Said to Mystify the I.R.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 
2003, at Cl (reporting that "Enron and other big companies have escaped taxes in recent years 
through financial maneuvers so complex that the Internal Revenue Service has been unable to under-
stand them," and that these transactions, while legal, "create [undisclosed] risks for shareholders"). 
81. For example, Barboza's article admits that some "Wall Street analysts called the restructur-
ing deals ingenious." Barboza, supra note SO, at C1. Nonetheless, even "Wall Street analysts, corpo-
rate executives with master's degrees in business administration and, sometimes, even the outside 
auditors reviewing a company's books" can have trouble understanding corporate disclosure. Lies-
man, supra note 61, at C1. 
82. See, e.g., KARL R. POPPER & KONRAD LORENZ, DIE ZUKUNFf 1ST OFFEN 74 (Franz Kreuzer 
ed., 1985) (arguing that some structures, like airplanes, contain so many ideas that they are not com-
prehensible to anyone individual; hence they require collaboration) (translated with the assistance of 
Oliver von Schweinitz, LL.M. 2(03); see also P. B. MEDAWAR, THE LIMITS OF SCIENCE 72-73 (1984) 
(observing that "modem science is beyond the comprehension of anyone mind .... [I]n reality we 
work not by single minds but by consortia of intelligences, past as well as present; for what we think or 
do now is a function of what others have thought and done before us-people whose past findings and 
past errors are part of our own inheritance or understanding. Thus a television set (perhaps the most 
complicated science-based contraption in everyday use) is not within the effective comprehension of 
anyone mind, for there is no one person who knows the electronics and the glass and vacuum tech-
nology and has the know-how of plastic molding to such a degree of proficiency that if some holocaust 
were to obliterate science and technology so that we had to begin again, this one knowledgeable hu-
man being could reinstruct and redirect the activities of those who would in due time reconstruct a 
television set. "). 
83. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the 
Modem Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. Ou. L. REV. 1233, 1238-39 (2002) (not-
ing the failure of investors to draw proper conclusions from their lack of understanding); Hubbard, 
supra note 31 (observing the failure of Enron's analysts, investment bankers, investors, and lenders to 
understand the significance of Enron's disclosed information); cf supra note 81 and accompanying 
text (observing that even experts can have trouble understanding corporate disclosure). 
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perts may be hired to the extent that their costs do not exceed the bene-
fits gained from more fully understanding the complexity,84 at some level 
of complexity those costs will exceed, or at least appear to exceed, any po-
tential gain. This is because the cost of hiring experts is tangible, 
whereas the benefit gained from fully understanding complex transac-
tions is intangible and harder to quantify. Managers attempting a cost-
benefit analysis may well give greater weight to the tangible cost and less 
credence to any intangible benefit.85 The more complex the transaction, 
the higher the costs, and thus the more likely it is that the cost-benefit 
balance will be out of equilibrium. 
Furthermore, market imperfections reduce the value of hiring ex-
pert analysts. Professors Healy and Palepu have found, for example, that 
investment-fund managers who, believing a stock is overvalued, nonethe-
less follow the crowd will not be blamed if the stock ultimately crashes.86 
This imperfection is exacerbated by the typically limited time horizon of 
analyst employment. The analyst may no longer be at the same job if 
and when a crash occurs, so accountability may be low to begin with.87 
On the flip side, even where analysts remain at the same job, they might 
lose their expertise over time. Presumably, they were hired because of 
their structured-transaction expertise, but structured-transaction markets 
84. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involv-
ing Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1,9-10 (1982) (arguing that if inadequate resources are 
being devoted to processing market information, then the potential for entrepreneurial gain through 
price arbitrage should provide an incentive for market professionals to invest in processing the infor-
mation "up to the point where a dollar spent will equal a dollar gained from making superior predic-
tions about the future"). 
85. The difficulties associated with balancing tangible costs against intangible benefits have been 
examined extensively in the context of corporate information-system ("IS") decision-making. See, e.g., 
Edward Rivard & Kate Kaiser, The Benefit of Quality IS, DATAMATION, Jan. 15, 1989, at 53 (empha-
sizing the need to educate management, "especially conservative management, on the importance of 
intangible benefits"). 
86. Paul M. Healy & Krishna Palepu, Governance and Intermediation Problems in Capital Mar-
kets: Evidence from the Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. (forthcoming 2003) (noting that nonindex 
fund managers are rewarded based on fund size and relative performance; fund manager who esti-
mates a stock is overvalued but does not act on this analysis "and simply follows the crowd" will not be 
rewarded for foreseeing the problems, "but neither will he be blamed for a poor investment decision 
when the stock ultimately crashes, since his peers made the same mistake"), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.comlso13/delivery.cfmlSSRN_ID325440_code020903590.pdf?abstractid=325440. As a re-
sult, "most of the most prestigious investment funds" held Enron stock notwithstanding its disclosure 
of its conflicted related-party transactions. Id.; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: 
A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. ON. L. REv. 1023, 1038 (2000) (discussing how herd behavior "may have 
a reputational pay-off even if the chosen course of action fails," and arguing that where "the action 
was consistent with approved conventional wisdom, the hit to the manager's reputation from an ad-
verse outcome is reduced") (citing Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate 
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 356 
(1996». 
87. See John Jacob et aI., Expenise in Forecasting Performance of Security Analysts, 28 J. ACCT. 
& ECON. 51, 59 (1999) (finding that the average length of analyst-company engagement for sell-side 
analysts is just "a little over eight years"). 
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evolve and, as analysts, they would no longer be employed doing market 
deals.88 
These market imperfections are consistent with the results that 
would be predicted by behavioral psychology.89 Complexity heightens 
ambiguity, which in turn-like the Delphic Oracle-allows people to see 
what they are already inclined to believe.90 Thus, the inclination to fol-
low the crowd is not surprising. Moreover, even for market profession-
als, it would be difficult to change this behavior.91 
Additionally, there are practical limitations on understanding com-
plexity even absent herd behavior. The complexity problem affects in-
vestors in the originator's securities, yet those investors are not necessar-
ily the same institutions that participate in structured transactions, and 
thus are less capable of understanding the complexity.92 Even when they 
are the same institutions, the analysts reviewing the disclosure will not 
88. Practicality is not all that constrains analysts from engaging in structured deals. A number of 
SEC rules and regulations require a strict division between transactional activities and investor analy-
sis. For example, SEC Rule lOb5-1 creates a presumption of insider-trading when a securities trader 
has access to nonpublic information. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb5-1 (2003). As a result, brokerage houses are 
required to maintain a "Chinese wall" between research and transactional activities to prevent inad-
vertent disclosures that would violate securities laws. See id. § 240.14e-3(b)(2)(ii) (establishing a Chi-
nese wall as an affirmative defense to a claim of misuse of insider information). The Securities Indus-
try Association Best Practice guidelines likewise recommend this separation. See SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, 
BEST PRAcnCES FOR RESEARCH (June 11, 2001), at http://www.sia.com/publications/pdfl 
BestPractices_F.pdf. For these reasons, research analysts are usually completely separate from in-
vestment bankers. Furthermore, recent possible abuses have motivated politicians to argue for even 
stricter separation. See, e.g., Henry Kaufman, A Straighter Path for Wall Street, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4, 
2002, at 19 (discussing New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer'S recent recommendation that Wall 
Street firms out-source their research to independent organizations); Brian P. Knestout, So Long, 
Salomon, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN., Jan. 1, 2003, at 58 (discussing Citigroup's plans to spin off a new 
subsidiary to house its research analysts and retail brokers). 
89. Although some have argued that behavioral psychology is not important for analyzing eco-
nomic market activity, recent scholarship suggests otherwise. Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: 
Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REv. 482 (2002). 
90. It is reported, for example, that King Croesus of Lydia wanted to make war on Cyrus, but 
was wary of doing so without heavenly sanction. After singling out the Delphic Oracle as the most 
reliable, the king's messengers "asked the practical question about the advisability of Croesus' going 
to war, and received the famous [and famously ambiguous) response that 'Croesus by crossing the Ha-
lys would destroy a mighty kingdom.'" THOMAS DEMPSEY, THE DELPHIC ORACLE: ITS EARLY HIs· 
TORY, INFLUENCE, AND FALL 70 (1918). Croesus interpreted this to mean what he wanted to hear-
that Cyrus would fall-but in fact the empire that fell was his own. [d. at 71; see also id. at 71,107 (dis-
cussing the historical method of the oracles as sheltering ignorance behind a "studied ambiguity" and 
vagueness). This same method of response is said also to be used today by fortune tellers. See J. 
Barkley Rosser, Alternative Keynesian and Post Keynesian Perspectives on Uncertainty and Expecta-
tions, 23 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 545, 554-57 (2001) (arguing that uncertainty leads to self-fulfilling 
mistakes); Tor, supra note 89, at 105, 174 (arguing that the combination of overconfidence and ambi-
guity leads investors to ignore potentially important information). 
91. Tor, supra note 89, at 560-61 (observing that "debiasing market decisionmakers is typically 
not a realistic option"); cf Coffee, supra note 2, at 1419 (arguing that securities analysts may fail in any 
bubble market). 
92. Recall that although structured transactions may well be able to be disclosed with sufficient 
depth and detail to adequately inform a sophisticated investor in the SPE's securities, such disclosure 
would often go over the head of an ordinary-or even sophisticated-investor in equity securities of 
the originator. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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likely be, and, as discussed, may be prohibited from being, the struc-
tured-transaction specialists.93 
Disclosure of complexity, therefore, has inherent limitations.94 
Whether or not institutional investors and analysts attempt to hire more 
structured-transaction experts in reaction to Enron and other corporate 
failures, the costs involved-as well as market imperfections and behav-
ioral psychology-appear to preclude this from being a complete long-
term solution. In a world of complexity, disclosure alone will sometimes 
be insufficient to remedy the information asymmetry between the origi-
nator and its investors. 
One therefore might ask whether structured-transaction disclosure 
could be reduced, in at least certain cases, to easy-to-understand ele-
ments, like contingent recourse against the originator. This has an ap-
parent simplicity: assess the risk that an originator will become liable for 
any contingent liabilities, and then include those liabilities, or a risk-
discounted portion thereof, in the originator's financial statements. This 
approach, however, would suffer from at least the same problems that a 
similar approach suffers in derivatives disclosure: it is impossible ex ante 
to precisely assess the risks, whereas a worst-case disclosure overempha-
sizes unlikely risks, while potentially ignoring risks that are more realis-
tic.95 
In addition to these problems, and even outside the derivatives con-
text, assigning a number to contingent liabilities has not proved a pana-
cea. Under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), compa-
nies have been required since 1975 to include contingent liabilities in 
their financial statements if it is probable that the liability will be in-
curred and the resulting loss can be reasonably estimated.96 If that loss 
cannot be reasonably estimated, or if the loss is merely reasonably possi-
ble, as opposed to probable, then companies are at least required to dis-
close the possibility of loss in the footnotes to their financial statements.97 
Only remote risks are not required to be disclosed.98 Nonetheless, and 
even though Enron's financial statements arguably complied with 
GAAP,99 investors lost because, viewed ex ante, there was only a remote 
risk in many of the SPE deals that Enron's stock price would dramati-
cally fall at the same time that the SPE-hedged investments would also 
93. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
94. See also infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text (discussing more generally the failure of 
professionals as securities gatekeepers). 
95. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that Item 305 mandated disclosure of 
"worst case" derivatives scenarios has those deleterious effects). 
96. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FiNANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD NO.5: ACCOUNT-
ING FOR CONTINGENCIES (1975). 
97. [d. 
98. [d. 
99. Cf supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (contending that Enron complied with its dis-
closure obligations even though investors did not get a clear picture). 
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significantly fall in value. loo Thus, there are no shortcuts to remedying 
disclosure's insufficiency.lOl 
B. Addressing Disclosure's Insufficiency 
There are three possible ways to respond to this insufficiency. The 
first is to tolerate insufficient disclosure and its resulting information 
asymmetry. The second is to proscribe transactions for which the asym-
metry exceeds certain bounds. The third is to require supplemental pro-
tections to minimize the asymmetry or mitigate its consequences. This 
article next examines each of these possible responses. 
1. Tolerating Insufficient Disclosure 
Under this response, disclosure would remain the sole paradigm for 
remedying the information asymmetry between the originator and its in-
vestors. At first blush, this response does not seem to be all that differ-
ent from the current disclosure regime, given that complexity has always 
existed to some extent. There is, after all, a wide variation of expertise 
among investors, and no doubt some investors are incapable of fully un-
derstanding at least some of the information disclosed. That reality has 
not been seen as a problem because, in an efficient market, it has been 
believed that stock prices virtually instantaneously reflect all publicly 
available information relevant to the value of traded stocks. I02 Thus, not 
all investors need to understand any given disclosure. The explanation 
for how markets can assimilate new information so rapidly stems from 
100. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. To the extent those risks, viewed ex ante, 
were "reasonably possible" and therefore disclosed in the footnotes to Enron's financial statements, 
investors also failed to understand the disclosure and, in some cases, even to scrutinize the footnotes. 
See Anne Tergesen, The Fine Print: How to Read Those Key Footnotes, Bus. WK., Feb. 4, 2002, at 94, 
94-95 (noting that investors "could have had a heads-up that all was not quite right at [Enron} long 
before the bad news broke in October. The source of this information? The footnotes companies are 
required to publish with their financial statements .... Footnotes do not make for easy reading, how-
ever, and the numbers are often difficult to decipher."). That's not surprising: Did you read this foot-
note before it was pointed out to you? 
101. Even the aspirational goals of § 401 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002-the section that at-
tempts to maximize GAAP disclosure of contingent liabilities-do not necessarily contemplate assign-
ing a single number to contingent liabilities. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 
U.S.C.A. § 7261 (West Supp. 2002» (providing that § 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.c. § 78m, is amended by adding at the end thereof a new subsection G) requiring the SEC to issue 
"final rules providing that each annual and quarterly financial report required to be filed with the 
Commission shall disclose all material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations (in-
cluding contingent obligations), and other relationships of the issuer with unconsolidated entities or 
other persons, that may have a material current or future effect on financial condition, changes in fi-
nancial condition, results of operations,liquidity, capital expenditures, capital resources, or significant 
components of revenues or expenses"). 
102. CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS 170-71 (3d ed. 1999) (referring to this belief as the "semi-strong" form of the efficient 
market hypothesis). 
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the existence of a large number of sophisticated market investors 
who trade for their own account or for the investors they represent. 
These professionals track all sources of information affecting the 
value of stock and act instantaneously to capture the "profit" avail-
able by buying stock at the "old" fair price. to3 
But complexity can undermine this result because, with complexity, 
few if any investors will actually understand the detailed disclosure.I04 
Thus, it is likely that less than a critical mass of investors to5 will be able to 
understand the disclosure in order to act to achieve an "efficient" mar-
ketYl6 It is even less likely that a critical mass of investors would be able 
to understand the disclosure in order to act instantaneously to achieve 
the efficient market.107 
This can be explained through the efficient-market model proposed 
by Professors Gilson and Kraakman. To clarify the "operational defini-
tion of market efficiency [that] tightly restricts the speed of the market's 
response to new information by requiring prices to reflect such informa-
tion 'always' -i.e., very promptly,"I08 they reason that there is actually a 
"continuum of availability" of new information, ranging from near-
universal distribution of information to information available to only a 
very few traders.l09 In the latter case, the focus will be on the time re-
quired for the market mechanism to force prices to an efficient equilib-
rium. l1O The less "available" new information is, the longer the time 
103. ld. at 171 (emphasis added); cf Douglas, supra note 43, at 524 (observing that "even though 
an investor has neither the time, money, nor intelligence to assimilate the mass of information in the 
registration statement, there will be those who can and who will do so, whenever there is a broad mar-
ket [and] [t]he judgment of those experts will be reflected in the market price"). 
104. Unless, as discussed supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text, institutional investors employ 
structured-transaction specialists as general analysts. That, however, can be quite costly, and any such 
specialists so employed would, in the rapidly changing market, lose their expertise over time. See suo 
pra notes 83-93. 
105. A critical mass in this situation constitutes investors having sufficient trading resources and 
market influence to move prices. 
106. Indeed, recent stock price anomalies have caused many to question even the "semi-strong" 
form of the efficient market hypothesis discussed above. See, e.g., O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra 
note 102, at 173-74 (observing that a flaw in this hypothesis may be that markets are dominated by 
traders whose systematic cognitive biases are not always rational); Gordon, supra note 83, at 1240 (ar-
guing that "Enron disturbs the efficient market hypothesis"); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, As· 
sumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992) (ques-
tioning the efficient market hypothesis); Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: 
CAPM and ECMH Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 
476-77 (1997) (discussing a contest run by the Wall Street Journal in which, over an eight-year period, 
professional money managers significantly outperformed random stock picks); Alex Berenson, 
Scream! Hold on for a Wild Ride, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002, § 4, at 1 (questioning the efficient market 
hypothesis: "[n]ow that U.S. stocks have fallen in value by almost $8 trillion in the last two years-
even though the economy is still expanding," and quoting Yale economics professor Robert Shiller 
that "[t]he idea that the market is going to reveal fundamental truths is nonsense," and Putnam In-
vestments chief investment officer Jeff Knight that "[t]he market price isn't set by rational analysis"). 
107. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. 
L. REV. 549 (1984). 
108. ld. at 560. 
109. ld. at 565-66. 
110. ld. at 566-67. 
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needed for "'full reflection' in price because [the information's] narrower 
distribution will force a qualitatively more circuitous form of price 
equilibration. "111 Thus, they argue, an innovative investment contract 
would take the market more time to understand and reach price equili-
bration than, say, a change in Federal Reserve Board policy.l12 Similarly, 
I argue that Enron's SPE-structures were, and indeed many perfectly le-
gitimate structured transactions are, so complex that less than a critical 
mass of investors can understand them in a reasonable time period, if in-
deed ever. To that extent, the market will not reach a fully informed 
price equilibrium, and hence will not be efficient. ll3 
Furthermore, the efficient market hypothesis might not even apply 
to public114 or private115 bond markets, yet investors in those markets suf-
fer the same information asymmetry discussed in this articleY6 Although 
it is possible that detailed disclosure may sometimes be understood and 
acted on instantaneously by a critical mass of investors,117 that result 
would only be sporadic. Thus, the belief that efficient markets will com-
pensate for disclosure's insufficiency, if ever justified,118 certainly is not 
justified in a world of complexity.ll9 
111. Id. at 567. 
112. Id. at 568, 585, 615--16; see also id. at 569 (observing that rapid price equilibration requires 
"only a minority of knowledgeable traders who control a critical volume of trading activity," but that 
"[m)any traders are too unsophisticated to make full use of the technical accounting information con-
tained in mandated disclosure reports"). 
113. I use the term "fully-informed price equilibrium" in the sense proposed by Gilson and Kra-
akman: the state in which, as a result of the full reflection of information into market price, there is an 
identity between actual market price and the price that would result if everyone was fully informed. 
Id. at 558, 565. The market is efficient if, and when, that identity is achieved. Id. at 558. 
114. See Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 242 (1988) 
("There is evidence that the market for corporate bonds is not very efficient. For many bond issues, it 
is not unusual to find infrequent trading activity and large spreads between bid and asked prices.") 
(citations omitted); Yedidia Z. Stern, A General Model for Corporate Acquisition Law, 26 J. CORP. L. 
675, 709 (2001) ("[S)tudies show that the bond market is not efficient; and therefore, one cannot ex-
pect the market prices to compensate bondholders for the risks to which they are exposed. ") I could 
find no authority in which commentators or experts concluded that debt, as opposed to publicly-traded 
equity, markets are efficient. 
115. Camden Asset Mgmt., L.P. v. Sunbeam Corp., No. 99-8275-CIV, slip op. at 31-36 (S.D. Fla. 
July 3, 2001) (privately placed Rule 144A-exempt securities, being thinly traded, do not have an effi-
cient market). 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 35--36 (observing that the information asymmetry is be-
tween an originator and its shareholders and bondholders). 
117. This situation would cause the relevant originator's stock prices to reflect publicly available 
information. 
118. Besides the questions raised by recent stock price anomalies, see supra note 106 and accom-
panying text, at least one court has held that stock traded on the National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) does not automatically have an efficient market. 
Stat-Tech Liquidating Trust v. Fenster, 981 F. Supp. 1325, 1346 (D. Colo. 1997). Scholars also have 
argued that "efficiency is not a market or an exchange attribute, but rather a characteristic of a given 
security during a given period of time. Even for a given security and time period, efficiency might vary 
across different information items." See Brad M. Barber et aI., The Fraud-on-the·Market Theory and 
the Indicators of Common Stocks' Efficiency, 19 J. CORP. L. 285, 290 (1994). 
119. Cf Saul Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 VA. L. REV. 645, 649-50, 
656 (1984) (arguing that market efficiency alone should not dictate policies concerning government 
regulation of the market without consideration of practical market effectiveness). 
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The other possible argument for tolerating insufficient disclosure is 
that-at least post-Enron-originators engaging in complex transactions 
may find their share price discounted by investorsYo Although ulti-
mately an empirical issue, this suggests that the market is already re-
sponding to the problem of complexity.121 If so, that would be an unfor-
tunate response because discounting share price based on complexity per 
se is inefficient. Complexity sometimes is justified. Where investors do 
not, or cannot, differentiate between justifiable and fraudulent complex-
ity,122 however, the market will discount in both cases-thereby driving 
out otherwise beneficial complexity.123 At the same time, fraudulent 
originators may try to hide complex transactions. In that case, the mar-
ket would be unable to apply any discount, an even more harmful result. 
For these reasons, it would be inexpedient to continue to tolerate 
disclosure as the sole paradigm for remedying the information asymme-
try between originators and investors. The converse proposition, pro-
scribing transactions for which disclosure would be insufficient, is equally 
problematic, as discussed below. 
120. Sheila Muto, Firms Use Synthetic Leases Despite Criticism, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20,2002, at B6 
("Concern about disclosure prompted an about-face last week by Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc., 
whose previous plan to finance the construction of $35 million manufacturing and distribution plant 
with a synthetic lease [a type of structured transaction) came under fire."); see also Mary Ellen Lloyd, 
Questioning the Books: Krispy Kreme Takes Steps to Increase Investor Confidence, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
8,2002, at A4 (reporting that trading in Krispy Kreme shares fell as much as fifteen percent following 
reports criticizing its legal, but off-balance-sheet financing); Ray Smith, Firms Await Ruling on Use of 
Synthetic Leases, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2002, at B8 (reporting that IDEC Pharmaceuticals Corp., which 
originally considered using a synthetic lease to finance the development of a new headquarters campus 
and manufacturing facility, decided instead to raise money through a traditional offering of senior 
notes). Compare Mark Maremont et a!., New Order: Amid Enron's Fallout, and a Sinking Stock, Tyco 
Plans a Breakup, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at Al (reporting that Tyco International Ltd., its stock 
price depressed amid persistent questions about its books, announced plan to split into four separate 
companies to offer investors "greatly increased simplicity, clarity and transparency;" and that a J.P. 
Morgan analyst said that dividing the company into smaller pieces should allay investor suspicion 
about Tyco's complexity because its financial statements are so complex that even veteran investors 
cannot understand them fully), with Stephen Frothingham, Tyco Abandons Plan to Split into 4, Will 
Close 24 Plants, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2002, at E3 (reporting that Tyco is scrapping its plan to break 
into four parts), and Gregory Zuckerman, Heralded Investors Suffer Huge Losses with Tyco Meltdown, 
WALL ST. J., June 10, 2002, at Cl (reporting that Tyco stock has lost substantial value since concerns 
first surfaced about its complex accounting). 
121. One must recognize, of course, that there is no assurance that, as Enron recedes into the 
past, the market will continue to respond in this fashion. Cf Oaire A. Hill, Why Financial Appear-
ances Might Matter: An Explanation for "Dirty Pooling" and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmet-
ics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141, 142-43 (1997) (observing that "[c)ompanies using accounting techniques 
to render themselves more opaque should be punished in the markets [but) ... [t)he real world is dra-
matically different."). 
122. The former being intrinsic, such as the complexity of quantum physics; the latter being com-
plexity intended for obfuscation, such as in a game of three-card Monte. See supra note 41 and ac-
companying text. 
123. See Charles Wilson, Adverse Selection, in 1 'filE NEW PALGRAVE DICfIONARY OF ECONOM· 
ICS 32, 32-33 (John Eatwell et a!. eds., 1987) (noting that, in this scenario, "the market allocation is 
almost always inefficient"); see also infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text (discussing the problem 
of asymmetric information). 
No.1] RETHINKING THE DISCLOSURE PARADIGM 21 
2. Proscribing Transactions for Which Disclosure Would Be Insufficient 
If government proscribed or banned transactions for which the in-
formation asymmetry exceeds certain bounds, the most immediate con-
sequence potentially would be to eliminate many, if not most, structured 
transactions. From a societal standpoint, that result would be unfortu-
nate. Even outside of the derivatives context,124 structured transactions 
are 
widely used and accepted in the United States. . .. Often, these 
transactions are efficient means of obtaining funding for their par-
ticipants while simultaneously achieving accounting, tax and regula-
tory benefits of various types .... [They] reflect the innovation for 
which the U.S. capital markets are known[,] ... have many legiti-
mate uses and comprise a significant part of our capital markets. l25 
These transactions are efficient because they transfer investment 
risks to investors who have the most expertise, or sometimes the most 
appetite to invest, in those risks.126 There is usually a panoply of risks as-
sociated with any given originator. In a securitization, for example, the 
originator separates particular financial assets from those risks by selling 
or otherwise transferring those assets to a "bankruptcy-remote" SPE.127 
Investors in the SPE can, therefore, base their investment decisions 
solely on the risks associated with the transferred assets.l28 Moreover, 
even those limited risks "can be borne by providers of credit enhance-
ment or investors in subordinated securities, parties who are in the busi-
ness of precisely assessing and absorbing such risks."129 As a result, the 
124. Derivatives transactions are widely used and efficient. See, e.g., Norman Menachem Feder, 
Deconstructing Over·the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 677, 678 (observing that de-
rivatives "trade globally and massively" and that "[ d]erivatives transactions drive companies today to 
efficiencies and sophistication unimaginable only two or three decades ago "); Roberta Romano, A 
Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1,4-5 (1996) (noting 
that "[t]he market for financial derivatives is in the trillions of dollars" and, notwithstanding the spec-
tacular losses suffered by certain investors in derivatives, "these instruments serve important economic 
functions that cannot be overemphasized"). 
125. In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2002) (First Interim Re-
port of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner), at 22 (noting, for example, that "total outstanding 
mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities in the United States alone exceed $6 trillion"), available 
at http://www.enron.comlcorp/por/pdfslInterimReport10fExaminer.pdf. 
126. In addition to obvious accounting and tax advantages, the efficiency of securitization transac-
tions, for example, is most evident when considering the specialties of the parties involved. For exam-
ple, a bank may specialize in originating mortgage loans. Although this specialty enables the bank to 
manage the risks associated with individual borrowers, another firm may be better suited to manage or 
bear large fmancial risks generally. See Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, supra 
note 22, at 1094-96 (explaining the benefits securitization can offer both to financial management and 
the origination and collection of financial assets). Securitization transactions thus efficiently shift risks 
away from the originators. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
127. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, supra note 17, at 135. 
128. Id. at 151 (explaining that "[b]ecause a bankruptcy remote structure separates the source of 
payment of the SPY's securities from the risks associated with the originator, the need to monitor the 
originator's financial condition is largely eliminated"). 
129. Id. Interestingly, this creates a paradox of sorts. By separating out and matching risks with 
investors having the most information about those risks, structured transactions actually can reduce 
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universe of investors interested in investing in those assets greatly ex-
pands, as witnessed, for example, by the tremendous success of organiza-
tions like the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae")130 
in helping banks to securitize home mortgage loan portfolios in order to 
increase their liquidity and enable them to make loans to new homeown-
ers.131 
The efficiency achieved by allocating risks in structured transactions 
is, in fact, sometimes imitated by companies in a larger context through a 
"corporate split."132 In these transactions, a company whose business 
consists of profitable and unprofitable product lines restructures by 
transferring assets associated with the profitable product line to a newly 
created affiliated company (Newco). Newco is owned by the same 
shareholders who own the original company (Oldco), now shorn of the 
assets transferred to Newco.133 The result is that the combined stock 
price of Newco and Oldco exceeds the stock price of the original com-
pany,B4 The price increase reflects a higher-valued allocation of risks 
with assets.135 Because corporate splits raise their own sets of legal is-
sues,136 however, they are not substitutes for structured transactions. 
Another reason that government should not want to proscribe 
transactions as a means of controlling information asymmetry is that any 
such proscriptions would create regulatory arbitrage incentives: parties 
would want to make transactions appear to meet the regulatory require-
information asymmetry. This article does not purport to balance this reduction in information asym-
metry with the increased information asymmetry resulting from more complex transaction structures. 
130. Although originally created as a government agency to establish a national secondary market 
for home mortgages, Fannie Mae is now a privately-managed corporation, though subject to certain 
governmental oversight. See FANNIE MAE, UNDERSTANDING FANNIE MAE AS A SECURITIES ISSUER, 
at http://www.fanniemae.comimbs/understanding/index.jhtml?p=Mortgage-Backed+Securities (last 
modified July 23, 2003). 
131. Thus, "Fannie Mae has played a vital role in the growth and development of today's expand-
ing secondary mortgage market by introducing major, innovative [securitized] products ... [which] 
offer investors high-quality investments with attractive yields to fit their portfolio needs or investment 
strategies." FANNIE MAE, BASICS OF FANNIE MAE MBS, at http://www.fanniemae.comimbs/ 
mbsbasics/marketlstructure.jhtml?p=Mortgage-Backed+Securities (last modified July 21, 2003). That, 
in turn, makes it "possible for low-, moderate-, and middle-income families to buy homes of their 
own." FANNIE MAE, ABOUT FANNIE MAE, at http://www.fanniemae.comiaboutfmiindex.jhtml?p= 
About+Fannie+Mae (last visited Oct. 16,2003); see also Structured Finance, supra note 17, § 1:2 (dis-
cussing the history of Fannie Mae and the Government National Mortgage Association in providing 
liquidity through the capital markets); Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, supra note 17, at 
153-54 (discussing how securitization increases bank lending to small businesses by transforming a 
bank's existing loan portfolio into asset-backed securities, which then can be easily sold to capital 
market investors, enabling the bank to use the sale proceeds for making new loans). 
132. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 
CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 678-82 (1996) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations 
to Creditors] (discussing corporate splits generally, including the highly publicized "Marriott split"). 
133. This is normally accomplished by a stock split or dividend in which shareholders of Oldco 
receive shares of Newco in an amount proportional to their holdings of Oldco stock. [d. at 678 n.131. 
134. See Glenn Collins, Hungry Shareholders vs. Wary Managers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1995, at 
A2. 
135. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, supra note 132, at 678-79 & 
n.132. 
136. See id. at 678-82. 
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ments.!37 For example, if government were to proscribe transactions for 
which the information asymmetry exceeded a threshold level, then par-
ties would attempt to structure those transactions in ways that appear to 
reduce the asymmetry, as measured by the regulatory ban, below that 
thresholdPs The end result could be socially undesirable: the regulatory 
proscription is effectively bypassed, but the overall transaction costs rise 
due to the expenses of lawyers and other advisors hired for that pur-
pose.139 
For these reasons, regulators should not want to proscribe struc-
tured transactions as a means of controlling information asymmetry.l40 
3. Requiring Supplemental Protections 
The foregoing analysis has shown that although the long-standing 
belief that markets will compensate for disclosure's insufficiency is not 
justified in a world of complexity, it would be socially harmful to ban 
complex transactions merely because of the information asymmetry. The 
third response, therefore, is to consider whether disclosure can be but-
tressed by cost-effective, supplemental protections that minimize that 
asymmetry or mitigate its consequences. 
137. Regulatory arbitrage occurs when parties design transactions-in this case, fmancial transac· 
tions-to try to "reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by differential regulations or 
laws." Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CoRP. L. 211, 
227 (1997). 
138. The propensity to try to capitalize on regulatory arbitrage is well illustrated by the motto of 
J.P. Morgan Securities' Structured Finance·Tax ProductslDerivatives Vehicles Group (the "Group"): 
"Anywhere you see a rule, you see an opportunity." Interview with Ajay Kumar Mehrotra, former 
Associate in that Group, in Durham, N.C. (Dec. 13, 2002). 
139. A more nuanced approach might be to proscribe transactions for which disclosure would be 
insufficient only where transaction costs and other externalities outweigh any public good. This ap· 
proach, however, appears impractical because, given the indeterminateness of balancing transaction 
costs and other externalities against public good, it would be difficult to identify these transactions ex 
ante. For example, the public good itself, as a concept, is ephemeral. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Na· 
ked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1702 (1984) (observing that "over 
time ... the category of public values expands and contracts"). Thus, in the heyday of Reaganomics, 
"[i]ncreased price competition was considered a public good because of its presumed beneficial effects 
upon consumer choice, economic efficiency, resource allocation and growth." Timothy A. Canova, 
The Transformation of u.s. Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition to Free·Market Receiv· 
ership, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (1995). At other times, redistributive schemes have been touted 
as promoting the public good. See Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection's Ra· 
tionality Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1,48 (1992). 
140. The reader should distinguish the foregoing analysis from the related question of the extent 
to which structured transactions should be accounted for, from the originator's standpoint, as off· 
balance sheet. That question is presently governed by GAAP, and its answer turns on such factors as 
the degree of control that the originator has over the SPEs used in the structured transaction and the 
extent to which independent third parties make equity investments in those SPEs. FIN. ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD No. 94 (1987). Although off·balance sheet 
structured transactions raise more difficulties for disclosure, the analysis of this Part 11.8.2, including 
Examiner Batson's observations, supra note 125 and accompanying text (describing structured trans· 
actions as being an efficient and legitimate means of obtaining funding that is widely used and ac· 
cepted in the U.S.), are all made in the context of the transactions being off·balance sheet. 
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In this context, it should be emphasized that any such supplemental 
protections would be in addition to, not in place of, disclosure. Even in-
sufficient disclosure provides value by reducing information asymme-
try,l41 and disclosure has other justifications beyond the asymmetric in-
formation problem.142 
In thinking about supplemental protections, it is useful to take into 
account economic theory on asymmetric information, especially that 
dealing with the so-called Lemons problem. Economists have asked: 
How do transactions ever occur if the seller has more information than 
the buyer, and the information disparity cannot be cured (at least at rea-
sonable cost)? Why would a buyer ever be willing to enter into a trans-
action? This, of course, is precisely the problem of complexity. 
The Lemons problem was introduced and first systematically stud-
ied by economist George Akerlof,t43 using the crude, but intuitive, exam-
ple of the used-car market: 
From time to time one hears either mention of or surprise at the 
large difference between new cars and those which have just left the 
showroom .... The individuals in this market buy a new automobile 
without knowing whether the car they buy will be good or a lemon. 
But [overall market statistics enable them to] know that with [a 
high] probability it is a good car and with [a lower] probability ... it 
is a lemon .... After owning a specific car, however, for a length of 
time, the car owner can form a good idea of the quality of this ma-
chine; i.e., the owner assigns a new probability to the event that his 
car is a lemon. This estimate is more accurate than the original es-
timate. An asymmetry in available information has developed: for 
the sellers now have more knowledge about the quality of a car than 
the buyers. But [absent a solution] good and bad [used] cars must 
still sell at the same price-since it is impossible for a buyer to tell 
the difference between a good [used] car and a bad [used] car.l44 
Akerlof argues that it is up to the seller to achieve a solution to this 
problem of quality uncertainty: "those [merchants] who can identify 
used cars in our example and can guarantee the quality may profit."145 
One obvious solution is guaranties,l46 such as warranties on the sale of 
141. This assumes that the value of such insufficient disclosure will exceed its cost. Whether that 
assumption will be true in all cases is beyond the scope of this article. 
142. Disclosure also can be seen as a means to break the management monopoly over corporate 
information, and is necessary because separation of ownership and control can cause managers to 
maximize their own utility at the expense of investors. JAMES D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DON· 
ALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION 358 (3d ed. 2(01). 
143. In fact, Akerlof won the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics for his work on this problem. See 
Press Release, The Nobel Foundation, 2001 Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory 
of Alfred Nobel (Oct. 10, 2001), at http://www.nobel.se/economicsliaureatesJ200llpress.htmi(last vis-
ited Oct. 23, 2(03). 
144. Akerlof, supra note 1, at 489-90 (emphasis added). 
145. [d. at 496 (emphasizing that "these skills are equally necessary-both to be able to identify 
the quality of inputs and to certify the quality of outputs"). 
146. [d. at 499. 
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goods,147 in order to shift the risk from the buyer to the seller. Other in-
stitutions that have arisen to counteract this problem are brand-name 
goods,l48 chains (such as hotel and restaurant chains),149 and governmen-
tal and private-sector certification through, for example, licensing. ISO 
Brand-name goods and chains, however, appear to be indirect guar-
anties made by placing the reputation of the goods or the chain as a hos-
tage. l51 If the goods are defective, or the chain provides inferior quality, 
then the reputation suffers. Therefore, one can view the possible solu-
tions as being in two categories: protect the buyer of (in the context of 
this article) securities either by (i) direct or indirect guaranties of their 
value or (ii) providing governmental and/or private-sector certification of 
their quality. I examine these protections in tum. 
Guaranties. The first approach to protecting a buyer of securities is 
to provide direct or indirect guaranties of the value of the securities. Di-
rect guaranties would not work to the extent that issuers of securities, by 
the very nature of the securities, are already making themselves liable to 
investors for repayment.!52 Nonetheless, there may be ways to create in-
direct guaranties, such as bonds or hostages, to be sacrificed in the event 
of management exploitation of the information asymmetry. 
An obvious way is to provide for case-by-case ex post review of, and 
some form of punishment for, management exploitation of the informa-
tion asymmetry, or to otherwise use ex post review as a sort of bond that 
substitutes for ex ante screening of the transaction. To the extent the ex-
ploitation amounts to fraud, this review is already performed by adminis-
trative agencies, such as the SEC, and through litigation in courtS.153 In 
147. See, e.g., U.CC §§ 2-312 to -315 (1998) (providing for warranties on the sale of goods). 
148. Akerlof, supra note 1, at 499. 
149. [d. at 500. 
150. [d. 
151. See id. 
152. In the case of debt securities, the originator is liable as a recourse obligation, and even equity 
securities give investors residual claims against the originator. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corpo-
ration's Obligations to Creditors, supra note 132, at 667. Moreover, any scheme to increase the priority 
of equity investors' residual claims would be problematic: making those claims pari passu with the 
originator's debt claims would dilute recovery on the latter, merely shifting some of the losses from the 
originator's equity investors to the originator's debt investors-whereas keeping the residual claims 
subordinate to debt claims would not improve the position of equity investors. 
153. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 781,787 (2001) (describing how the United States has partially solved the "informa-
tion asymmetry problem through a complex set of laws and private and public institutions that give 
investors reasonable assurance that the issuer is being (mostly) truthful"). Rule 10b-5 under the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act"), for example, makes it unlawful for any person in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security: 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in 
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 CF.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2003). 
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those cases, the punishment includes civil liability and possible criminal 
prosecution of management.154 
An ex post approach, though, is a blunt instrument. It poorly filters 
bad transactions because they will be discovered only after they OCCUr.155 
And it creates uncertainty for, and imposes a chilling effect on, good 
transactions because of the possibility that an originator with complex 
transactions-even those viewed ex ante as justifiable-can fail. 156 Man-
agement then would have to argue ex post, possibly in the face of adverse 
pUblicity and zealous government officials, that the failed complex trans-
actions were not fraudulent. 157 
Certification of Quality. The second approach to protecting a buyer 
of securities is certification of their quality either by the government or 
reputable private-sector entities. Governmental certification is a form of 
merit regulation,158 and can be expensive. In the context of the original 
enactment of the federal securities laws, it was explicitly rejected as un-
workable.159 At that time, there was significant controversy over whether 
federal law should focus on requiring full disclosure or on imposing gov-
ernmental merit analysis. l60 State "blue sky" laws provided for both.161 
Nonetheless, Congress, "[a]fter considerable debate, ... decided not to 
follow the pattern of the state acts and eschewed the idea of a merit ap-
proach, opting instead for a system of full disclosure. "162 There is little 
154. Securities fraud causes of action, for example, may be criminal, civil, or administrative in na-
ture. 17 c.P.R. § 202.5(b). Por an overview of possible civil, criminal, and administrative actions taken 
in the event of securities law violations, see Alyssa Hall & Adam M. Schoeberlein, Securities Fraud, 37 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 941 (2000). See also William S. Lerach, The Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995-27 Months Later: Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act's Brave New World, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 597 (1998) (discussing class action lawsuits as a 
possible response to management exploitation of information asymmetry). 
155. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 
77 TEX. L. REV. 515 (1999) (discussing problems associated with ex post approach). 
156. Cf id. at 592 (arguing that ex post judicial reassessment of a troubled debtor's determination 
whether offered-liquidity is likely to help the debtor rehabilitate may cause the "liquidity [to] dry up 
because few liquidity providers would be willing to be second-guessed"); Schwarcz, Use and Abuse of 
Special Purpose Entities, supra note 5, at 1313 (arguing that Enron's management and its accountants 
were, in many cases, making exquisitely fine judgment calls, and that although, in retrospect, they may 
have misjudged, the culpability of their actions should be assessed ex ante, not ex post). 
157. It is human nature to infer the obvious, though incorrect, cause from a dramatic event. Cf 
DON HEROLD, THE HAppy HYPOCHONDRIAC 64 (1962) (a humorous book in which, after surviving 
numerous imagined scares, a hypochondriac ultimately dies of old age; but on his gravestone appear 
the words, "See, I told you I was no hypochondriac."). 
158. Indeed, at a fundamental level, government regulation and government certification are re-
lated concepts. The government effectively certifies as "legal" only those transactions that comply 
with the regulation. 
159. See Knauss, supra note 42, at 615 (arguing that "[t]he main argument for disclosure was that 
a regulatory approach was not administratively practical"). 
160. See generally 1 HAZEN, supra note 49, § 1.2, at 21-34 (tracing early developments in securi-
ties regulation). 
161. 1 id. § 1.2[2], at 26 (observing that "the state blue sky laws not only focused on providing in-
vestors with full disclosure of relevant facts, but also required that all securities registered thereunder 
'qualify' on a merit basis, evaluating the substantive terms of the securities to be offered"). 
162. 1 id. § 1.2[3][A], at 27-28. Part of Congress's rationale was that a disclosure-approach would 
avoid any implication that, by approving issuance of a security, the government was guaranteeing its 
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current literature on government certification of securities quality be-
cause, until recently, disclosure was seen as the complete answer. 
Should we now reconsider some form of substantive governmental 
merit regulation? One might argue, based on the historical experience of 
the state blue sky laws, that merit regulation is ineffective and not worth 
its COSt.163 But it is unclear whether those laws were a fair test of merit 
regulation. Although the "blue sky laws proved to be relatively ineffec-
tive in stamping out securities frauds, especially on a national level,"l64 
such ineffectiveness "should not condemn this type of [substantive] con-
trol. The States had effective power only within their boundaries. And 
the amazing interstate complexity of the security business made action by 
the separate States conspicuously ineffective."165 
It nonetheless continues to appear that if other supplemental pro-
tections are available, governmental merit regulation would not be cost-
effective. Such merit regulation would, by definition, rely on govern-
ment employees to assess the quality of securities. l66 It is doubtful that 
these employees would do a better job than private-sector analysts, who 
already perform this function for investors.167 The private-sector analysts 
are likely to be more capable, on average, and also more accountable, 
because the government generally pays lower salaries than the private 
sectorl68 and government employees are often harder to fire if they per-
form poorly.169 Furthermore, the imposition of governmental merit regu-
soundness. James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933,28 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 29, 30, 34 (1959-196O). 
163. The perceived inefficiency of merit regulation is predicated on a belief in the efficiency of 
disclosure as a corrective mechanism. Under this theory, full disclosure obviates any need for merit 
regulation, by increasing corporate transparency. Merit regulation is thus redundant and not cost-
effective. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 
2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 1,21 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets) (explaining this 
argument but recognizing that "[t)he historical rationale for full disclosure ... is not always applica-
ble"). Additionally, merit regulation assumes an ability to assess ex ante the quality of a security. 
Even assuming low-quality securities can be identified, "it is not evident why a disclosure requirement 
would not have been equally efficacious at alerting consumers to the dangers of a particular issue, 
while not foreclosing the market entirely to consumers willing to take the risks in order to get a chance 
at the rewards." Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. 
REV. 347,395 (1991). But cf JOSEPH C. LONG, BLUE SKY LAW §1:56 (2002) (arguing that because the 
federal securities-law scheme does not preempt state blue sky laws, see 15 U.s.c. § 77r (2002), enact-
ment of the federal scheme was not a complete rejection of merit regulation). 
164. 1 HAZEN, supra note 49, § 1.2, at 26. 
165. Douglas, supra note 43, at 531. 
166. To the extent government delegates this job to the private sector, that would be a form of 
private ordering, discussed infra notes 171-80 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of this 
topic, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 319 (2002). 
167. See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text (discussing the role of securities analysts and 
other professionals as gatekeepers). 
168. For a thorough discussion of the correlation between public- and private-sector salaries, see 
Craig A. Olson et aI., The Effects of Local Market Conditions on Two Pay-Setting Systems in the Fed-
eral Sector, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 272 (2ooo). A possible reason that private firms pay more is 
that they have to rely more heavily on reputation than government regulators, which operate through 
fiat. 
169. See, e.g., Kathryn Moss et aI., Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the 1mplementation 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 50 U. KAN. 
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lation and resulting duplication of these functions not only would be in-
herently inefficient but, perversely, could actually undermine the market 
for private securities analysts, thereby eliminating any reduced informa-
tion asymmetry resulting from their analysis yo 
This article, therefore, next examines the extent to which private-
sector certification of quality would be sufficient to reduce this informa-
tion asymmetry. Private-sector certification of quality already exists, and 
it has not proved effective in the face of complexity. For example, inves-
tors already demand ratings by nongovernmental rating agencies on the 
safety of debt securities. l7l But rating-agency certification, while valu-
able, has not been a panacea. Ratings are presently only given on debt, 
not equity, securities.172 Ratings also do not purport to certify against 
fraud.173 Possibly for this reason the rating agencies failed to predict En-
ron's demise, and Enron's debt was not downgraded below investment 
grade until days before its bankruptcy.174 Nor would it appear to be cost-
effective for rating agencies to certify against fraud.175 
An indirect form of private-sector certification of quality is also per-
formed by outside professionals involved in the originator's issuance of 
securities.176 Traditionally, a professional gatekeeper-such as an inde-
L. REV. 1,71 (2001) (quoting an EEOC staff member: "It is next to impossible ... to fire someone [in 
the federal government 1 for poor performance. Performance is much too difficult to establish. You 
cannot even set up numerical performance goals for investigators."); see also Oeveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1985) (holding that federal agencies must comply with strict due 
process standards when terminating employees "for cause"); David R. Riemer, Government As Ad-
ministrator vs. Government As Purchaser: Do Rules or Markets Create Greater Accountability in Serv-
ing the Poor?, 28 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1715, 1719 (2001) (conduding that because the civil service sys-
tem lacks the tools to fire the mediocre or reward the stars, "the level of competence in any 
governmental structure is dismal"). 
170. I next argue that the information asymmetry caused by complexity exists, and will persist, 
notwithstanding scrutiny by private-sector securities analysts. That argument is not inconsistent with 
the text above; analyst scrutiny may reduce, but does not remove, the information asymmetry. 
171. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets, supra note 163, at 3 (citing Steven L. 
Schwarcz, The Universal Language of Cross-Border Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 235, 251-52 
(1998»; see also Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for 
the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1999). 
172. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets, supra note 163, at 6 (citing Steven L. 
Schwarcz, The Universal Language of Cross-Border Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 235, 253 n.82 
(1998». 
173. Id. (citing Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal Language of Cross-Border Finance, 8 DUKE J. 
COMPo & INT'LL. 235, 252 n.76 (1998». 
174. Hearings, supra note 53, at 17 (testimony of Frank Partnoy). 
175. Rating agencies presently do not have the resources, such as investigative staff, to investigate 
possible fraud of the companies whose securities they are rating. Interview with John Rutherford, Jr., 
President and Chief Executive Officer, Moody's Corporation, and Raymond w. McDaniel, President, 
Moody's Investors Service, Inc., in Durham, N.C. (Sept. 24, 2002). If a rating agency were to obtain 
such resources, there is concern that the greatly increased staffing and size would bureaucratize the 
ratings process (making individual staff members feel less personally responsible), with unintended 
consequences. Id. Furthermore, this increased staffing, along with the premium required to offset 
litigation and settlement costs resulting from failures to discover fraud, would significantly increase the 
cost of ratings, potentially undermining their economic vitality. 
176. Another indirect form of private-sector certification of quality is management's signaling, to 
investors, that they believe in the originator. Traditionally, management does this by investing in the 
originator's stock and by accepting stock options as compensation. A HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS LAW 
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pendent auditor, securities analyst, investment banker, or, at times, a 
lawyer- "represents to the market ... that it has evaluated the issuer's 
product and good faith and that it is prepared to stake its reputation on 
the value of the innovation."177 Post-Enron, however, there has been 
much discussion about the failure of professionals as gatekeepers.178 This 
failure may be rooted in the basic conflict of interest faced by gatekeep-
ers: a "desire to be perceived as credible and objective may often be sub-
ordinated to [a] desire to retain and please ... clients. "179 As a result, the 
public has lost confidence, at least temporarily, in traditional gatekeeper 
mechanisms. ISO 
The foregoing discussion suggests that certification of the quality of 
securities, whether by government or third parties, cannot fully solve the 
asymmetric information problem in a cost-effective manner. I next in-
quire whether some lesser form of certification could do so. 
Certification need not go so far as merit regulation. There may be 
less costly approaches, perhaps certifying not quality but a lesser, observ-
able standard that may help to determine quality. One such approach 
would be to mitigate the conflicts of interest that create the risk that an 
originator's management will structure transactions contrary to the inter-
ests of investors.181 
TERMS 570 (Bryan A. Gamer ed., 1999). This certification did not prove reliable in Emon, however, 
and is unlikely to be reliable because complexity impairs the ability of nonconflicted managers to fully 
judge the merits of the transaction. Cf infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text (arguing, for this 
reason, that approval of conflicted "disclosure-impaired" transactions by disinterested directors could 
backfire). 
177. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 107, at 619. 
178. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 1404-05; see also Hearings, supra note 53, at 15--18 (testi-
mony of Frank Partnoy) (recommending inquiry into the roles of the "major financial market 'gate-
keepers' involved with Enron: accounting firms, banks, law firms, and credit rating agencies"). 
179. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1408. 
180. Regulatory approaches might be able to minimize these conflicts of interest by, for example, 
requiring that at least certain professional gatekeepers-e.g., independent auditors-be paid directly 
through public funding. But even that approach would be imperfect. If gatekeepers are selected by 
companies but paid by the public, then the gatekeepers would still want to please their client-
companies; whereas choosing and paying gatekeepers through public-sector mechanisms would merely 
constitute another form of government merit regulation, discussed above. The insidious effect of 
gatekeeper conflicts of interest also might be reduced to some extent by requiring -at least for audi-
tors-that opinions comply with principle-based, as opposed to rule-based, standards. That presuma-
bly would require the auditor to exercise independent judgment based on principles, instead of merely 
certifying that financial statements comply with the technical rules of GAAP, which sometimes can be 
manipulated. Id. at 1416-17; see also Peter Jeffrey, International Harmonization of Accounting Stan-
dards, and the Question of Off-Balance Sheet Treatment, 12 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 341 (2002) 
(comparing GAAP's rule-based standards with the principle-based standards of lAS (International 
Accounting Standards»; Hoyd Norris, An Old Case Is Returning to Haunt Auditors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
1,2002, at C1 (noting that SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt has been citing United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 
796 (2d Cir. 1969), for the proposition that auditors sometime will be held to standards beyond 
GAAP). For a discussion of these and other possible models for reform, see Coffee, supra note 2, at 
1416-17,1420. 
181. I am not advocating mitigating all conflicts, only those present in disclosure-impaired trans-
actions. Corporation law recognizes that all conflicts of interest cannot be entirely eradicated, and 
permits transactions in the face of conflicts of interest if decisions are made or ratified by noncon-
flicted parties. In Delaware, for example, although courts can review the fairness of interested-party 
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To understand this risk, consider the problem in Enron. Enron's 
investors were unable to rely on Enron management in setting up SPE 
structures for Enron's benefit. l82 Indeed, the Powers Report finds evi-
dence that Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow and certain other En-
ron executives either overruled or intimidated employees who felt that 
the SPE transactions were detrimental to Enron and its shareholders.ls3 
These manipulations thrived because of a tangled web of conflicts of in-
terest: senior Enron executives, most notably Fastow, served as the 
SPEs' principals, receiving such massive amounts of compensation and 
returns as to potentially skew their loyalty in favor of the SPEs. l84 Non-
conflicted management, on the other hand, may have resisted or at least 
questioned Enron's entering into dubious structured transactions that, if 
failed, could (and did) bring down the company.IS5 
Regulationl86 could be used to this end by restricting or, as shown 
below, ideally by prohibiting conflicts in complex transactions for which 
disclosure would be insufficient (disclosure-impaired transactions).I87 
transactions, Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (De\. 1991), ratification by independent directors or 
shareholders reinstates the traditional business judgment rule, under which courts will not undertake 
to second-guess the expediency of business transactions so authorized. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. 
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (De\. 1971) ("A board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business 
judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business pur-
pose. A court under such circumstances will not substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound 
business judgment."); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 23 (De\. Ch. 2002); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 
A.2d 327, 336 (De\. Ch. 1997); Gries Sports Enters., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 
959, 963-64 (Ohio 1986) ("The rule is a rebuttable presumption that directors are better equipped 
than the courts to make business judgments and that the directors acted without self-dealing or per-
sonal interest and exercised reasonable diligence and acted with good faith."). U.S. securities law of-
ten takes the same approach. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Comments of 
Securities Industry Association on SR-NASD-2002-21 and SR-NYSE-2002-09, 1321 PLUCoRP. 475, 
477-78 (2002) ("We agree with the premise that, as a general principle, disclosure is a better approach 
to managing real or apparent conflicts of interest than prescriptive prohibitions, which can be both 
overly complex and subject to evasion"). Thus, rather than prohibiting conflicts of interest in corpo-
rate transactions, Item 404( a) of Regulation S-K mandates disclosure of any transaction in which any 
of the following had a "direct or indirect material interest"; (1) directors and executive officers; (2) 
nominees for election as directors; (3) holders of more than five percent of any of the registrant's vot-
ing securities; or (4) "any member of the immediate family of any" of these persons. 17 c.F.R. 
§ 229.404(a) (2003). 
182. Powers Report, supra note 6. 
183. ld. at 18,21, 144, 166-67 (discussing allegations that Enron-CFO Fastow, on behalf of the 
UM-SPEs, pressured Enron personnel to give favorable terms to such SPEs, even though such terms 
are not in the best interests of Enron shareholders). 
184. Id. at 41, 60, 77, 102. These Enron executives also may have received financial windfalls in 
connection with the termination of SPEs. Id. at 60-61. For example, the unwinding of the Rhythms 
transaction (with respect to which "Enron did not seek or obtain a fairness opinion") "resulted in a 
huge windfall" to that SPE, and thus to the Enron executives associated with it. /d. at 89. 
185. Cf Coffee, supra note 2, at 1403 (suggesting Enron's management conflicts of interest as key 
factors in its downfall). 
186. Recall that regulation is fundamentally a form of government certification-the government 
effectively certifies as "legal" only those transactions that comply with the regulation. See supra note 
153 and accompanying text. 
187. I show infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text how disclosure-impaired transactions can 
be identified. Note that the insufficiency should be judged from the standpoint of the originator's in-
vestors, the audience primarily affected by the information asymmetry. But should that audience be 
judged by the average investor, the average institutional investor, or perhaps even on the average se-
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Restrictions may require active and ongoing monitoring of conflicts,188 
which can be difficult to manage. In Enron, for example, senior execu-
tives seemed to have a somewhat casual approach toward compliance 
with the conflicts-of-interest requirements of Enron's Code of Con-
duct. 189 The required Board approval of these types of conflicts was not 
always obtained. l90 Even where approval was obtained, the monitoring 
required as a condition to approval was not always properly imple-
mented. l91 
More tellingly, the Powers Report concludes that "a conflict ... that 
could be managed only through so many controls and procedures should 
not have been approved in the first place,,,I92 explaining that 
perhaps the most basic reason that controls failed was structural. 
Most of the controls were based on a model in which Enron's busi-
ness units were in full command of transactions and had the time 
and motivation to find the highest price for assets they were selling. 
In some cases, transactions were consistent with this model, but in 
many of the transactions the assumptions underlying this model did 
not apply.193 
Restricting conflicts of interest, short of prohibiting them, therefore 
may not always be feasible. But a rule prohibiting material conflicts of 
interest194 in disclosure-impaired transactions (postulated rule) should be 
curities analyst? The efficient market hypothesis suggests that disclosure understood only by securi-
ties analysts and sophisticated institutional investors nonetheless would be sufficient. See supra Part 
II.A. On the other hand, the "average investor" standard is more in keeping with the SEC's tradi-
tional requirements. Section 13(j) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines "reasonable detail" 
as "such level of detail ... as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs." 15 
V.S.c.A. § 78m(b)(7) (2003). Recently, in response to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11,15,18,28, and 29 V.S.c.A.), the 
SEC announced new disclosure guidance for off-balance sheet arrangements. 68 Fed. Reg. 5982 (Feb. 
5,2(03). Section 1I1.E.2 of the final rule states that "[t]he information should not be presented in such 
a manner that only an accountant or financial analyst or an expert on a particular industry would be 
able to fully understand it." Id. at 5991 (emphasis added). 
188. All references in this article to "conflicts" mean material conflicts. See infra note 194 and 
accompanying text. 
189. Enron's Code of Conduct provided, in relevant part, that no officer or employee should 
"[o]wn an interest in or participate, directly or indirectly, in the profits of any other entity which 
does business with ... the Company, unless such ownership or participation has been previously 
disclosed in writing to the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Enron Corp. 
and such officer has determined that such interest or participation does not adversely affect the 
best interests of the Company." 
Powers Report, supra note 6, at 44 n.8. 
190. Neither Fastow nor other participating Enron employees obtained Board permission for the 
conflict in the Chewco transaction, for example. Id. at 41. 
191. For example, Fastow obtained appropriate permission for his participation as general partner 
in the UM SPEs, based on the understanding that transactions between Enron and those SPEs be 
subject to approval by Enron's Chief Accounting Officer and Chief Risk Officer, and also be annually 
reviewed by Enron's Audit and Compliance Committee. Id. at 68-69, 71, 154. These controls, how-
ever, if implemented, "did not accomplish their intended purpose." Id. at 150. 
192. Id. at 156. 
193. Id. at 171. 
194. I focus only on material, as opposed to all, such conflicts of interest because immaterial con-
flicts should not impair the judgment of the originator's management in setting up structured transac-
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more feasible. 195 Once a conflict is identified, such a rule would not en-
tail ongoing or active monitoring. This rule also should be effective be-
cause it reduces the agency-cost problem: absent conflicts, investors 
should be able to rely on the business judgment of the originator's man-
agement in setting up structured transactions for the originator's benefit. 
Moreover, the postulated rule would not appear to impose any sig-
nificant costs. Although it may be difficult to determine the existence of 
the conflict,l96 that determination imposes no additional cost because con-
flicts already have to be identified in order to address the existing duty-
of-loyalty requirements of corporate law.197 While there may be a cost to 
management of having to identify disclosure-impaired transactions,198 
that identification would only have to be made in those limited cases 
where there is a material conflict. Absent such a conflict, identification is 
unnecessary. And, though it appears difficult to specify in advance any 
given set of criteria for defining what constitutes a disclosure-impaired 
transaction,199 disclosure impairment should be able to be assessed on an 
tions for the originator's benefit. Even the Powers Report recognizes that it was the magnitude of the 
conflict that was most problematic in the Enron SPE transactions. [d. at 148. 
195. The postulated rule is thus different from existing corporate law duty-of-Ioyalty require-
ments, which allow nonconflicted directors to approve conflicted transactions. See supra note 181 and 
accompanying text (discussing existing approaches to corporate law duty-of-Ioyalty requirements). 
My article proposes applying the postulated rule in place of such existing requirements in the rela-
tively narrow context of insider disclosure-impaired transactions. The existing duty-of-Ioyalty re-
quirements would continue to apply outside that context. Hence, a originator could enter into a con-
flicted transaction that is not disclosure impaired, so long as the transaction is approved by the 
originator's nonconflicted directors. I later explicitly compare the postulated rule with the existing 
duty-of-Ioyalty requirements, arguing that the former is more appropriate for insider disclosure-
impaired transactions because, in that context, nonconflicted directors may not understand the con-
flicted transactions well enough to objectively assess them. See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying 
text (comparing the postulated rule with existing corporate law duty-of-Ioyalty requirements). I do 
not challenge, and indeed I am agnostic on, existing corporate law duty-of-Ioyalty requirements out-
side of that context. 
196. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 61 (2000) ("[W]hat constitutes a conflict-of-
interest is often not clear. "). 
197. See id.; see also 1 JAMES D. Cox, THOMAS LEE HAZEN & F. HODGE O'NEAL, CORPORA-
TIONS § 10.42 (Supp. 2 1998) ("In most jurisdictions, interested directors are not counted toward the 
quorum necessary for the board to take action on the transaction in which the directors have a inter-
est.") (citations omitted). 
198. This identification would certainly be much easier than having to identify disclosure-
impaired transactions, in which transaction costs and other externalities outweigh any public good, 
which would require an indeterminate balancing. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
199. One such possible approach might be to define disclosure-impaired transactions as transac-
tions for which contingent liabilities cannot be readily displayed. But that would appear to be too 
broad a definition because the material impact of structured transactions can rarely be quantified. See 
supra note 95 and accompanying text. Another approach might be to assume that all structured trans-
actions are disclosure impaired, and thus effectively prohibit all conflicts of interest in these transac-
tions. The simplicity of this solution is appealing, and it is not unprecedented-in the 1880s, such a 
rule was generally enforced in the United States. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, 
CORPORATIONS 647 (7th ed. 1995). But this approach again would be overly broad and, worse, it 
would merely shift the focus to trying to define what constitutes a "structured" transaction, creating 
the potential for regulatory arbitrage. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. 
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ad hoc basis, perhaps under the tenet "we know it when we see it.,,200 
This notion reflects that disclosure impairment is easier to recognize than 
to define.201 
Ad hoc assessment of disclosure impairment, however, introduces 
two possible costs. The first is that good conflicted transactions some-
times may be turned down. This cost should be small, however, because 
"there often appears to be no positive corporate or social purpose served 
by fair self-dealing transactions that could not be served by fair transac-
tions with true outsiders."202 For this reason, commentators have re-
cently questioned whether corporate self-dealing should ever be permit-
ted: 
The often expressed justification for [favoring disclosure over pro-
hibition is that the latter] prevents the corporation from entering 
advantageous contracts with its directors. It is an unexplored em-
pirical question as to just how often corporations get deals from 
their directors which the company could not have received from 
someone else, and whether this prospect outweighs the advantages 
of having a simpler test.203 
Indeed, Congress itself has recently indicated that prohibiting conflicts is 
appropriate in certain circumstances.204 
The other possible cost is that an originator's management would be 
subject to the risk that a court, ex post, will second-guess the determina-
200. Justice Stewart once adopted a similar approach in defining obscenity. See Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not today attempt further to define 
the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within [hard-core pornography 1; and perhaps I 
could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture in-
volved in this case is not that.") (emphasis added). Since then, the Supreme Court has adopted a more 
particular test for adjudicating obscenity cases. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) 
("[Wlhether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the 
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest .... ") (citations omitted); see also Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). 
201. In pornography cases, courts err on the side of allowing First Amendment free speech. See 
Miller, 413 U.S. at 23 ("We acknowledge, however, the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate 
any form of expression."). No constitutional issues are involved in making a disclosure impairment 
determination. Hence, courts need not decide such questions with a particular bias. 
202. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 180 (1986). Professors Black and Kraakman suggest 
that the United States' shift from a prohibitive model in the late 1800s-which imposed a strict prohi-
bition on self-dealing - to the permissive model we now experience was not efficiency- or policy-based, 
but simply the result of lobbying by corporate managers. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A 
Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1911, 1975 (1996). 
203. GEVURTZ, supra note 196, at 323 (emphasis added); accord CLARK, supra note 202, at 180-
89 (arguing that "all basic self-dealing presents a significant danger of abuse or unfairness, and the 
danger is not made insignificant by the safeguards in the prevailing legal rules or by other controls 
over managerial misconduct"). Even commentators willing to permit self-dealing under limited cir-
cumstances recognize that it is imperfect. See, e.g., 1 Cox, HAZEN & O'NEAL, supra note 197, § 10.42 
n.3 (noting that although conflicted directors do not vote, as a practical matter they can still influence 
the votes of their fellow directors). 
204. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 402,116 Stat. 745, 787-88 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k) (West Supp. 2002» (amending section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 to prohibit issuers of securities from directly or indirectly making personal loans to directors 
and executive officers). The postulated rule is similar, if not more discrete, only prohibiting corporate 
managers from material conflicts of interest in disclosure-impaired transactions. 
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tion of disclosure impairment. This risk likewise should be small. Where 
management determines a conflicted transaction is disclosure impaired, 
the originator simply will not engage in the transaction without eliminat-
ing the conflict.205 If management is wrong, then there should be no basis 
for a claim because, as discussed, companies appear to derive little, if 
any, benefit from fair self-dealing transactions that cannot be served by 
truly independent transactions.206 Management only would be exposed 
to risk when the originator enters into a conflicted transaction that man-
agement incorrectly determines not to be disclosure impaired. As in all 
other business decisions, however, management would then be protected 
by the business judgment rule: if members of management act in good 
faith and have a reasonable basis for their determination, then they can-
not be penalized by an ex post contrary determination.207 This protec-
tion,208 and management's ability to err on the side of determining that 
transactions are disclosure impaired, should mitigate the second-guessing 
risk. 
The postulated rule, therefore, should not impose any significant 
costs. But even if it did, such costs would be justified, because leaving 
only existing corporate law duty-of-Ioyalty requirements209 to govern con-
flicts in disclosure-impaired transactions would be even more costly.2tO 
205. To eliminate the conflict, the originator sometimes may need to remove conflicted parties 
from both sides of the transaction-from the originator's side, and also from the side of the transaction 
itself-if necessary in order to remove any motivation such parties may have for using the transaction 
to take advantage of the originator. 
206. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text. Thus, at least one of the inefficiencies of ex 
post review being an imperfect filter- that some conflicted nondisclosure impaired transactions will be 
incorrectly treated as conflicted disclosure impaired transactions and not entered into-should not be 
costly. 
207. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing the business judgment rule). One 
might ask, however, why management's determination should be judged by the corporate law busi· 
ness-judgment-rule standard and not by a stricter securities·law·violation standard. I believe the for· 
mer standard is more appropriate because the postulated rule-requiring management to be free of 
any material conflicts of interest stemming from disclosure-impaired transactions-is more akin to 
corporate law and corporate governance than to securities law. The most fundamental justification for 
the postulated rule is to protect shareholders where the originator contemplates entering into con· 
flicted transactions that cannot be adequately disclosed to such shareholders, not ensuring that the 
ultimate disclosure is adequate. Indeed, the postulated rule does not need to address how a transac· 
tion is actually disclosed, and whether that disclosure satisfies securities laws. 
208. Although this protection suffers the other inefficiency of ex post review being an imperfect 
filter-that some conflicted disclosure-impaired transactions will not be recognized-that is a price 
that must be paid in order to create a pragmatic system for management decision-making. 
209. Those requirements allow nonconflicted board members to approve disclosure·impaired 
transactions as fair to the originator's investors. See supra note 181 and accompanying text; see also 
GEVURTZ, supra note 196, at 324 (observing that most states have adopted legislation providing that a 
conflicted corporate transaction will not be voidable where it is approved by disinterested directors or 
by shareholders, or where the transaction is proved to be fair; I do not focus on shareholder approval 
because there is little chance that shareholders will be able to understand the complexity where disin· 
terested directors are unable to do so). 
210. See GEVURTZ, supra note 196, at 323 (noting that, in comparison with existing duty-of· 
loyalty requirements, a rule prohibiting conflicted transactions would have the "merit of simplicity"). 
Professor Gevurtz also maintains that a rule requiring a "fairness test means costly trials with uncer· 
tain outcomes. The indeterminacy of the fairness approach also means that occasionally directors may 
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The existing requirements are ineffectual in those transactions, fostering 
waste and sheltering fraud, because board members, like investors, rarely 
are able to understand the complexities. In Enron, for example, few of 
senior management, including board members, understood its SPE 
deals.211 Testimony in derivatives cases likewise indicates that few board 
members understand those transactions.212 This should not be surprising: 
structured transactions are highly specialized and technical, and involve 
complex vocabularies.213 Directors seldom have the expertise to under-
stand them, and they are not paid nearly enough to justify learning to do 
so. Even if, as some have recently suggested, corporate boards were to 
employ full-time professional directors, these directors are unlikely to be 
structured-transaction specialists, much less specialists in all forms of 
structured transactions.214 
Furthermore, approval of conflicted disclosure-impaired transac-
tions by disinterested directors could backfire, lulling investors into a 
false sense of security. Merely disclosing the existence of the conflicts is 
also inadequate. For example, the Enron conflicts were disclosed,215 yet 
investors did not adequately judge the risks.216 
I therefore propose that government regulation should require 
management to be free of any material conflicts of interest in disclosure-
impaired transactions.217 Of course, eliminating these conflicted transac-
tions does not assure that structured transactions will ultimately benefit 
the originator's investors. Eliminating conflicts reduces, but does not 
eliminate, the risk that a company's management will enter into dubious 
transactions. Investors take this risk in any investment, however, and so 
long as corporate managers are permitted to exercise discretion, no 
amount of regulation can protect against it.21B But eliminating conflicts 
does increase the likelihood that the originator's management will at-
be able to get away with taking advantage of their corporations .... " [d. Complexity would increase 
both the cost and the indeterminacy of such a rule. 
211. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
212. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (citing management failures to understand deriva-
tives, which lead to spectacular losses). 
213. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
214. Recall that structured transactions include derivatives transactions, securitization transac-
tions, and other forms of structured fmancing. 
215. See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECfIOUS GREED 331 (2003) (observing that "[a]nyone who closely 
read Enron's public filings from 2000 and 2001 would have spotted the description of Fastow's in-
volvement and compensation"). 
216. This is not, of course, a complete answer because Enron is only a single case, and I have not 
provided empirical data of how investors respond to this disclosure in other cases. Nonetheless, it logi-
cally follows that if investors are unable to comprehend a transaction because of its complexity, see 
supra Part Il.A, then they are also unlikely to understand the significance of conflicts in the transac-
tion. 
217. This article does not focus on remedies for breaching this regulation, other than to observe 
that such remedies should deter management malfeasance without deterring capable individuals from 
acting as managers. 
218. This risk-that through bad judgment or just bad luck, management will guess wrong and 
make losing investments-is different from the risk that conflicted management will cause the origina-
tor to enter into questionable transactions. 
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tempt to structure its transactions solely for the intended benefit of such 
investors.219 
Whatever approach is taken to solving our Lemons problem,220 it 
should be cautioned that solutions will be imperfect because investors 
are sometimes irrational.221 Professor Gordon observes, for example, 
that 
it was known and widely discussed in the analytic community that 
Enron's financial structure was highly complex and that the bodies 
were buried in off-balance sheet entities that were cryptically de-
scribed in Enron's disclosure documents. No one on the outside 
really understood Enron's financial condition but they also knew 
they didn't know ... '. [I]n an efficient market, Enron should have 
been a 'lemons' stock instead of a 'faith' stock.222 
III. CONCLUSION 
The complexity of structured transactions undermines the long-held 
disclosure paradigm, in which sophisticated investors and securities ana-
lysts bring market prices into line with disclosure. Even if these parties 
were to consider hiring teams of experts as needed to decipher complex 
structured transactions, empirical evidence and theory both suggest that 
the information asymmetry between companies and their investors will 
remain.223 
Proscribing structured transactions would forfeit their efficiency and 
other benefits.224 Tolerating insufficient disclosure likewise has a cost: 
the losses caused by the aforesaid information asymmetry. Continued 
reliance on disclosure as the sole means to remedy the information 
asymmetry is justified, therefore, only in the absence of cost-effective 
supplemental protections. 
Although these protections might include governmental or private-
sector certifications of quality, or even direct or indirect guaranties of 
value, this article argues that only one supplemental protection is 
219. Management, of course, has an obligation to engage in transactions for the benefit of share-
holders and, in certain cases, bondholders. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Credi-
tors, supra note 132, at 647. 
220. Akerlof, supra note 1, at 499. 
221. See Gordon, supra note 83, at 1236. 
222. Id. at 1236 (referring to Akerlof, supra note 1); accord Healy & Palepu, supra note 86, at 23 
(noting that most investors continued to hold Enron stock even after articles about Enron's related-
party transactions questioned the stock price); Sheila McNulty, A Victim of its Opacity, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Nov. 12,2001, at 13 (observing that "[a]nalysts, who were paid to scrutinize [Enron], joked 
with journalists about failing to understand its books-and proceeded to issue the next 'buy' recom-
mendation"). 
223. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (arguing, among other things, that the cost of 
hiring experts can exceed, or at least appear to exceed, the benefit gained from fully understanding 
complex structured transactions; and that market imperfections, behavioral psychology, and practical 
limitations further undermine this balance). 
224. See supra notes 124-31 (describing such efficiency and benefits). 
No.1] RETHINKING THE DISCLOSURE PARADIGM 37 
needed: a rule requiring management to be free of material conflicts of 
interest stemming from disclosure-impaired transactions.z25 The ration-
ale for this rule is that, in the face of complexity, investors must rely not 
only on disclosure, but also on the business judgment of management in 
setting up complex transactions for the company's benefit. To that end, 
the law similarly should focus on, in addition to disclosure, requiring 
management to be free of conflicts of interest that would affect manage-
ment's judgment in those transactions. This focus would have prevented 
the conflicts of interest that allowed, and indeed encouraged, the Enron 
abuses to thrive. 
I do not argue that the protection provided by this rule, coupled 
with disclosure and traditional constraints, such as gate keeping, will as-
sure the legitimacy of the securities market.226 I only contend that be-
cause Enron and other recent scandals have created perceptions of dis-
trust of the securities markets generally, and uneasiness with structured 
transactions specifically, it is important to inquire how to design cost-
effective controls to reduce these perceptions and their underlying real-
ity, even though the controls may be second-best.227 
In this context, a commentator at a workshop in which this article 
was presented likened this rule to sticking one's finger in the snow to try 
to stop a sled going downhilp28 That analogy, though intended to de-
scribe the limitations of the rule, is nonetheless useful in illustrating its 
strengths. Consider the movement of the sled to be financial innovation. 
Sledding is generally good, but if a sled glides too fast it can go out of 
control. Sticking one's finger in the snow may well be the appropriate 
remedy needed to slow down the sled in order to regain control. Simi-
larly, financial innovation is generally good, and society should not want 
to discourage it. But it too can skid out of control, as was the case in En-
ron. By slowing down the propensity of managers to engage in conflicted 
structured transactions, the rule helps to ensure that financial innovation 
does not go out of control. 
225. This rule certifies not quality per se, but a lesser, observable standard that may help to de-
termine quality: the absence of conflicts of interest. That absence reduces the risk that an originator's 
management will structure transactions contrary to the interests of investors. See supra notes 194-99. 
226. An additional limitation is that the rule itself will only be as good as its enforcement mecha-
nism. Although this article does not discuss remedies, the rule expresses a corporate law duty, and 
thus the remedy for its breach should not depart greatly from remedies traditionally available for vio-
lations of corporate law. 
227. It may well be that there is no "best" solution to the problem of complexity. Complexity is 
not simply a characteristic of the information per se but, more precisely, of the relationship between 
that information and the inherent limitations of the audience to which it is addressed. Cf ISAIAH 
BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY (Henry Hardy ed., 1991) (discussing humankind's 
limitations). 
228. Comment of Richard A. Epstein, James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor, The 
University of Chicago (Oct. 22, 2002, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Workshop, The 
University of Chicago). 
38 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2004 
